City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

6-2022

Negative Dialectics in Elliott Carter: Toward an Adornian
Aesthetics of Carter's Music
Gregory J. Menillo
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4845
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

NEGATIVE DIALECTICS IN ELLIOTT CARTER:
TOWARD AN ADORNIAN AESTHETICS OF CARTER’S MUSIC

by

GREGORY JOSEPH MENILLO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Music in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.
2022

© 2022
GREGORY JOSEPH MENILLO
All rights reserved

ii

Negative Dialectics in Elliott Carter:
Toward an Adornian Aesthetics of Carter’s Music
by
Gregory Joseph Menillo

This manuscript has been read and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in Music
in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Anne Stone, Chair of Examining Committee

Date

Norman Carey, Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Jeff Nichols (advisor)
Bruce Saylor (first reader)
Scott Burnham
Anne Stone

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT
Negative Dialectics in Elliott Carter:
Toward an Adornian Aesthetics of Carter’s Music
by
Gregory Joseph Menillo
Advisor: Jeff Nichols
This dissertation is an attempt to lay the groundwork for an Adornian aesthetics of Elliott
Carter’s music. The first chapter suggests that Theodor W. Adorno’s negative dialectics is the
most appropriate paradigm for understanding the material antagonisms that characterize Carter’s
music over a quasi-Hegelian “unity of opposites” as suggested in the Carter scholarship. Chapter
Two demonstrates this through an Adornian reading of key aspects of the first movement of
Carter’s 1948 Sonata for Cello and Piano, the watershed work for Carter’s mature style. The
third chapter addresses the issue of musical time in Carter from a philosophical perspective; it
discusses the philosophical thought referenced in Carter’s 1976 essay “Music and the Time
Screen” and offers an Adornian critique in an effort to reframe the “matter of time” in Carter’s
music on a materialist basis. Chapter Four offers a very close reading of the first page of Gra
(1993) for solo clarinet in order to demonstrate how Adorno’s notion of conceptual non-identity
can be applied to the analysis of a work from Carter’s later period. The final chapter briefly
considers an historical framing of Carter’s periodization and suggests possible socio-historical
interpretive avenues to pursue in a fuller treatment of Carter’s aesthetics.
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CHAPTER ONE
Against a Unity of Opposites: Adorno’s Negative Dialectics

I will begin by responding to Marguerite Boland’s (2015) idealistic, quasi-Hegelian
characterization of Carter’s music in order to articulate two key divergences in my interpretation
of his aesthetics. Boland’s dissertation insightfully articulates many core features of Carter’s
music and also presents fine analyses of a selection of his latter works. While her interpretation
often leans on aspects of Adorno’s work, it ignores Adorno’s emphasis on non-identity, reading
negative dialectics as temperamentally “pessimistic” instead of understanding negation as the
critical key to Adorno’s thought. My interpretation of Carter’s aesthetics will both retain and
emphasize dialectical negation; this means pursuing the notion of contradiction in Carter’s music
as expressed in antagonisms of part and whole, concrete and abstract, and individual and
collective. Furthermore, I will seek to interpret Carter’s aesthetics dialectically: recognizing that
the contradictions and disruptions on the material, formal level of Carter’s compositions can be
connected to those on the broader socio-historical level of American society. This chapter will
suggest that Adorno’s negative dialectics, properly understood, most adequately reveals the
constructive tensions inherent in Carter’s work. It will also lay the groundwork for a thoroughly
dialectical consideration of how Carter’s music is determined by the historical tensions of his
social world, which I will sketch in my final chapter.

Two Divergences
Boland’s dissertation broadly rejects Adorno’s negative dialectics on the grounds that it seems
politically pessimistic and therefore inappropriate to Carter, who was “too much of an optimist”
(Boland 2017: 17).1 Instead, it reads dialectics positively in Carter’s music, claiming a quasiHegelian “unity of opposites” for his aesthetics. The core argument is that Carter’s music as a
whole represents (or presents?) certain oppositions—whether of texture or character—which are
then “unified” (or sublated) on a higher order—i.e. through the totality of a piece’s construction.
A further claim, following this premise, is that his music in general thus resembles a kind of
“utopian vision” of a democratic society not yet historically realized.

While I do not wish to pursue a critique of Boland’s fine work, I will state at the outset that my
interpretation will diverge from hers on these two important and related points. First, I claim that
Adorno’s negative dialectic is most appropriate for interpreting Carter’s music. Following
Adorno, my interpretation will seek to understand the various oppositions in Carter as productive
tensions that are not sublated in a Hegelian sense, but consciously laid bare as unreconciled
(perhaps even irreconcilable) antagonisms. For an adequate interpretation of this, Adorno’s
negative dialectics is crucial.

My second distinction stems from the ramifications of reading negative dialectics in Carter. If
one accepts Adorno’s theory, one is committed to pursuing a dialectical approach to interpreting
his music. This means not only accounting for the material, formal level of Carter’s work (itself a

1

“While Adorno’s negative dialectics does not seem to hold much resonance with Carter’s musical aesthetic—as
many have noted Carter was too much of an optimist… Adorno’s analysis of the disintegration of society and the
disintegration of modern music is mostly interpreted as a bleak prognosis for society and art music alike; as Carter
said of Adorno’s Philosophie der neuen Musik, ‘It is depressing’” (Boland 2017: 17-18).
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dialectic) but also the socio-historical world that mediates this work in particular ways. For
example, it would be necessary to understand the main antagonism (preferable to opposition) in
Carter’s Cello Sonata as a (negative) dialectic, but not sufficient.2 A dialectical interpretation also
seeks to understand what this particular antagonism means at this point in Carter’s career, both
within the context of musical modernism as a discourse and, furthermore, within the context of
postwar American society. One may also view this issue from the other direction: given that
Adorno’s theory argues that the social world, itself rife with antagonistic tendencies, mediates
works of art, one must ask what the antagonisms of both postwar American society and musical
modernism can tell us about Carter’s Cello Sonata. Essentially, a dialectical approach recognizes
that there is a reciprocal relationship between Carter and his material, Carter’s music and
postwar modernism at large, and of course particular works and their social situation; it therefore
requires each of these to be brought into proper focus for an adequate interpretation of Carter’s
aesthetics as a whole.

One further note on a dialectical approach: considering Carter’s aesthetics “as a whole” from a
dialectical standpoint is itself a bit of a contradiction, if not an oxymoron. Dialectics emphasizes
the fact that there is motion in thought, and, furthermore, that it is historically determined. To say
that Carter’s musical aesthetic “is as such” insists that it is a stable, self-identical thing, which
“it” is not. I would prefer to think of Carter’s aesthetics (emphasis on the plural) as a process
with certain discernable tendencies, based on demonstrable aesthetic commitments, which are
actualized within particular pieces throughout Carter’s lifetime. This will require pursuing the

2

As will become clear, my use the term “dialectic” throughout this dissertation will assume an Adornian valence.
When distinguishing it from Hegel’s (or Boland’s) I will often insert “negative,” as Adorno does. For the sake of
clarity, my unqualified use of the term dialectic, “negative dialectic,” and “Adorno’s dialectic” should all be
understood as referring to the same idea.
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dialectic of Carter’s aesthetics throughout his work while recognizing, importantly, that his work
“as a whole” is not adequately reducible to certain abstract, universal principles over and above
the particular pieces. My basic claim is that Carter’s commitments, tendencies, and methods of
actualization changed both through an immanent process of working through his material from
piece to piece and in response to particular tendencies in his changing socio-historical world. I
will attempt to trace some of these contours over the course of my work below.

Adorno is crucial to this endeavor because he offers a method of thinking through the most
advanced forms of musical composition in relation to their socio-historical dialectic. Adorno
suggests that there is not merely a socio-historical dialectic at play in music, but that this
dialectic is the key to unlocking its meaning. If Carter represents the forefront of American
modernism faithfully pursued over the greater part of the post-war period and beyond, an
aesthetics of his music must also consider not only the history of this period but the degree to
which its changing socio-historical dynamics are implicated in the material of the works
themselves. In this light, it should be no surprise that the dynamics of Carter’s mature
compositional practice track the dramatic shifts in post-war American life. More than mere
coincidence, I will argue that Carter’s work is significant because it most fully and faithfully
registers these shifting dynamics.

I believe that this approach will have important ramifications for a proper periodization for
Carter’s work “as a whole” and especially for the issue of aesthetic semblance in relation to
Carter’s later period, which I additionally argue is critical for a convincing assessment of
Carter’s “late style.” While I will introduce a periodization of Carter’s oeuvre in my final
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chapter, it is merely keep in view the particular historical tensions that have had consequential
impact on the shape of postwar American society and Carter’s music. My socio-historical
framework should be taken as seriously as it is useful for adequately evaluating particular works
and must be revised when the works themselves deem it necessary.

In sum, this dissertation will lay the groundwork for a dialectical interpretation of Carter’s music
as informed by Adorno. My approach will attempt to articulate the material dialectic of his
practice, which is both immanently dialectical and also determined by the socio-historical
dialectic postwar American society and beyond. Following this methodology, I reach particular
conclusions that diverge from some of the interpretation of Carter’s aesthetics in the scholarship.
For example, my second divergence with Boland: I hope to eventually show that what Boland
characterizes as an “image of utopia” in “Carter’s music” is actually a particular kind of aesthetic
semblance that Carter is able to achieve in certain works of his later period only, and only as a
result of particular changes in his socially mediated compositional approach. This conclusion
requires pursuing the material and socio-historical dialectics through Carter’s entire mature
creative output—i.e. it requires building a thorough philosophical aesthetics of Carter’s music
from the ground up. Granted, this is a task beyond the scope of this dissertation, but I nonetheless
hope to lay the groundwork for it and offer particular insights into certain central ideas that will
contribute to a more complete interpretation of his aesthetics along the way.

To begin, it is necessary to clarify my understanding of Adorno’s negative dialectics and how it
is relevant to Carter’s music.

5

Dialectics: Positive or Negative?
At the end of the first of a series of lectures given on negative dialectics, Adorno mentions a
question posed to him regarding his preference for the term:
Given that the concept of dialectics [in Hegel] contains the element of negativity
precisely because of the presence of contradiction, does this not mean that every
dialectics is a negative dialectics and that [the] introduction of the word ‘negative’ is a
kind of tautology? (Adorno 2008: 11)
In other words, aren’t dialectics already negative? Why does Adorno insist on calling dialectics
negative?

The textbook understanding of Hegel’s dialectics is the triadic movement of thesis-antithesissynthesis: the first stage is that of fixed understanding (thesis); upon reflection, contradictions
(antitheses) emerge among fixed concepts of understanding; the motion of thought through
contradiction(s) then seeks to resolve them, emerging on a higher level of reason—the dialectical
motion of thesis through its antithesis to a higher level of synthesis. Another way of
characterizing the three stages is affirmation, negation, and “negation of the negation.” Hegel
refers to the motion of the third stage as Aufhebung, or sublation, which is understood as both
cancellation and preservation: by going through negation, aspects of the original thought are
preserved while others are changed, and thus thought is raised to a higher level. Hegel’s system
of philosophy is a continuous motion of this dialectic to higher and higher forms, ultimately
reaching the Absolute, the highest resolution of all contradictions wherein thought is complete
and all encompassing.
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Adorno makes two main distinctions between his negative dialectics and Hegel’s—in his
words—“positive” dialectics. The first is in his sophisticated reading of the motion of the
dialectic in Hegel, through which he attempts to show that the level of synthesis—which, in
negative dialectics, is “very much reduced in importance” (Adorno 2008: 6)—is not necessarily a
“negation of the negation,” a positive resolution thesis and antithesis, but that it instead be read
as an expression of the non-identity of the two oppositions at hand. Adorno insists on this
because, as he claims, contradictions cannot be resolved in a Hegelian fashion. This is a nuanced
philosophical point that Adorno labors to show over the course of his work, which I shall explore
below as it becomes immediately relevant.

The second distinction, which comes from a socio-historical perspective, is more
straightforward. For Adorno, Hegel presents a philosophical system—an understanding of the
totality of thought and its relation to the world—that has been contradicted by the cataclysmic
events of the early 20th century. Hegel’s dialectics, which do contain a negative moment,
nonetheless sublate all conceptual (and social) contradictions in Spirit’s progresses toward the
Absolute, toward all-encompassing reason. Accepting this teleology means accepting not only
the notion that the historical arc of humanity tends toward greater progress, emancipation, and
the like, but also that the current state of humanity is, by definition, a greater actualization of
Spirit than hitherto before—in other words, a more “rational totality.” For Adorno, this is
unacceptable.3 Hegel’s famous dictum, “what is actual is rational” (Hegel 1967: 20), must be

3

“Hegel’s negations culminate into a rational totality… The positive nature of the dialectic as a whole, the fact that
we can recognize the totality as rational right down to the irrationality of its individual components, the fact that we
can declare that the totality to be meaningful – that is what seems to me to have become untenable” (Adorno 2008:
19).
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refused in the 20th century; only the opposite is true: what is actual—as in, actually existing
society—is irrational.

Adorno is blunt in his refusal of Hegel’s idealism. Hegel’s philosophy cannot be accepted in a
world that has seen the advances of human civilization lead not to greater human emancipation,
but more extreme forms of domination and destruction. His claim that “to write poetry after
Auschwitz is barbaric” (Adorno 1983: 35) is meant to underscore this point; his thesis in
Dialectic of Enlightenment—that Enlightenment itself reverts toward its opposite—intends to
negate it. In an era of industrial genocide and atomic weapons of mass destruction, to take
Hegel’s “positive” dialectic at its face is to blind oneself to these counterfactuals; even worse, to
be stupefied by the ideological force of affirmative consumer culture (Adorno, 2008: 19).

Behind Adorno’s polemics is a carefully constructed critique of both philosophy and society, two
levels of human understanding and experience that must be responsive to one another, are indeed
“intwined” with one another.4 Adorno’s insistence on the negative is in part to distinguish his
dialectical approach to philosophy from Hegel’s positive dialectics, to preserve its motion while
negating its teleology.5 It also intends to be a corrective to the “fetishization positive” that he
observes in post-war administered society, which is ideologically affirmative to the extent to
which it is structurally antagonistic. This latter point will become clear in my discussion of
Carter’s Cello Sonata below, which can be read both as a dialectical negation of his own

4

The thrust of Adorno’s work is to show us the extent to which thought is mediated by the world; the extent to
which the world is mediated by thought is more of a muted point. I will discuss this in a section on the relation of
Subject to Object below.
5
In a sense, Adorno’s philosophy attempts to sublate Hegel’s: it retains the dialectical motion of his thought while
refusing its conclusions. Yet, also poses a negative dialectical relation to it, without sublation: Adorno’s work does
not cancel Hegel, does not rise above it, but sends us back to Hegel with a more critical eye.
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populism and an embodiment of the socio-hisotrical antagonism that underlie the onset of the
Cold War era.

Negative dialectics should therefore be understood as both a philosophical critique and a social
critique. The philosophical critique is aimed at the side of thought, the Subjective side, which
shows that that there are contradictions at the core of thinking. Furthermore, these conceptual
contradictions cannot be resolved in Hegelian fashion because of the existence of contradictions
in the social world, the Objective side, which Critical Theory—negative dialectics when turned
on society—seeks to articulate.

Non-Identity and the Concept of Contradiction
At its core, negative dialectics reveals the non-identical between Subject and Object, mind and
world; it is “a philosophical project that does not presuppose the identity of being and thought,”
as in Hegel and, likewise, does not culminate in their identity either. Adorno’s negative dialectics
seeks not to unify opposites, but to articulate the “the divergence of concept and thing, subject
and object, and [to underscore] their unreconciled state” (Adorno 2008: 6). This is done not by
pursuing difference or otherness as such, or by reveling in contradiction for the sake of being
critical, but by recognizing that there are fundamental contradictions within both
conceptualization and actually existing society that require articulation and critique.

In essence, the concept of contradiction is the cornerstone of negative dialectics. Adorno pursues
contradiction on two levels—the conceptual level and the social level, which he claims are the
Subjective and Objective sides of the dialectic.
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The Conceptual Level
Adorno sees contradiction on the conceptual level as twofold: there is a contradiction in the very
nature of the concept itself and there is a contradiction when the concept enters into relation with
that to which it refers. The first point is logical: when expressed as an equation, the equivalency
between concept and referent, A = B, must always be false. Adorno’s point is that conceptual
identity cannot be claimed for two different objects in the world of experience simply because
we experience the difference between them and ourselves. A cannot equal B.
A = B is self-contradictory because our experience and our perception tell us that B is not
A. Thus [sic] because of the forms of our logic practice this coercion on identity,
whatever resists identity necessarily assumes the character of a contradiction. (Adorno
2008: 8)
The contradiction in the logical form does not mean that conceptualization itself is invalid,
however. Adorno merely wishes to illustrate an important truth about the relationship between
concept and referent that is often ignored: that it is as much a relation of non-identity as it is of
identity. Identity thinking, which is privileged by logic, scientific rationality, and other forms of
instrumental reason, is pernicious because it occludes the non-identical by claiming that separate
things may nonetheless be considered equivalent—it privileges a positive identity over
difference, ultimately leading us to believe in false equivalences. For Adorno, thought is only
adequate if it turns to the element of non-identity in its own thinking, reminds itself of this tacit
contradiction.

A second point follows, which teases out the non-identical in Adorno’s theory further:
…by saying that A is everything that is comprehended in this unity [of elements of a
phenomena], I necessarily include countless characteristics that are not integrated into the
individual elements contained in this concept… When a B is defined as an A, it is always
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also different from and more than the A, the concept under which it is subsumed by way
of a predicative judgment. (Adorno 2008: 8)
In other words, any phenomenon in question can never be fully expressed in its
conceptualization because of its unique particularities. In this sense, the phenomena is always
“more than” its concept. This is a crucial point for Adorno, which is obvious in any serious
attempt at the analysis of music.

For example, the opening of Carter’s Gra for solo clarinet: to state that it is merely as an allinterval tetrachord (AIT) obviously does not get to the heart of the ingenuity and expressiveness
of the passage.6 That we do not content ourselves with an unqualified analysis of set classes—
perhaps the music theoretical paragon of a reductive concept—without concerning ourselves
with the particularities of rhythm, register, articulation, and dynamics that unfold the diversity of
its intervallic structure with both economy and elegance, to say nothing of how the passage does
not conform to our concept of the all-interval tetrachord with the first note of measure five, is a
testament to Adorno’s observation that the particular phenomena is always more than what is
subsumed under its concept.

6

Not to mention that it is just one of the two possible tetrachordal schemata that contains one of each interval class
in the total possible dyadic relations between its elements.
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Example 1.1: Carter – Gra, measures 1-7.

An Adornian interpretation of the passage would attend to how Carter subverts the identity of the
AIT, once established, and the general ambivalence of identity—or non-identity—the pitch
formulations suggest with reference to both the AIT and the All Trichord Hexachord—Gra’s two
main “musical concepts”—over the course of the work. For example, there is a constructive
tension in the first four measures between concept and referent as expressed by register and
character, set class and partition. The four pitches—E, F, Ab, Bb (as written)—are fixed in
register; furthermore, they are fixed in “normal form,” as a single (0146) tetrachord beginning on
E3. On an abstract level, this is the reductive musical concept that governs the first four
measures. On the other hand, the articulation of musical characters attempt to draw out
particularities—two opposing musical characters, one legato and dynamic (changing volume),
the other marcato and dynamically static (forte), which alternatively tease out the different
possible dyadic partitions of this basic set, one character contradicting the other with its dyadic
complement. The tension of limited register is enhanced by the tension of limited possibilities for
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dyadic partition, which becomes exhausted by this “game” the characters play by end of measure
three. I understand the quintuplet figure in measure four as a new character, as it is further
developed later in the piece, intervening as a “summary” of the tetrachord at the moment the
previous two characters have exhausted the limit of unique partitions of the tetrachord. Were this
the end of the story, it would be fair to say that the reductive concept—the fixed (0146)—has
succeeded in dominating the musical discourse, but Carter undermines this reading in the next
two measures: the “game” continues, expanded now with three and four notes per character, with
two new pitches, C and B natural. What was previously heard, very emphatically, as a very
deliberate unfolding of an all-interval tetrachord, is now revealed to be just a subset of a larger
all-trichord hexachord, subsequently unfolded in such a way to “reconceptualize” the previous
dyadic partitions as portions of trichordal partitions. Taken together, measures five and six are a
moment of non-identity in this passage, wherein a reductive concept, the AIT, hitherto assumed
as ultimate as it was immobile, is undermined, shown to be less than the actuality of the music,
the particular course the musical characters take. Granted, the AIT could be understood as being
“replaced” by a larger governing concept, the ATH (which itself will also be undermined), but a
more sensitive reading would suggest that this musical concept was undermined right at the
moment where it was assumed to be reified, fixed and immobile. One could go so far as to say
that the “game” of this piece is a dialectical one: negating musical concepts at the moment they
are becoming rigid, maintaining the (negative) dialectical motion between abstract and concrete.

This is the first lesson of negative dialectics, the importance of turning toward the nonidentical.7 The concept of the non-identical will become crucial in considering Carter’s harmonic
7

“Turning toward the non-identical” is an apt summary of the whole of Carter’s harmonic approach in his later
music, as will be discussed below.
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practice in general, and especially that of his Seconda Prattica, to which this piece belongs,
wherein the tension between harmonic identity versus non-identity becomes its animating force.

Returning to the notion of conceptual contradiction at the core of negative dialectics, Adorno
shows us that the reverse is true as well: concepts can also be more than their referents. Adorno’s
example is the concept of freedom, which is always more than instances freedom actualized in
the world, always points to more than the particular freedoms real people enjoy both historically
and at present.8

An example of this latter contradiction relevant to Carter’s music is the entire concept of musical
modernism. As I will argue, despite the decline of musical modernism in the neoliberal period
(beginning roughly in 1980), Carter is uniquely able to not only persist in a modernist idiom but
also to redefine it under a social paradigm that otherwise resists the actuality of such a concept.9
That we say a concept is “redefined” means that there is an aspect of the concept itself that is
open to more than its particular instantiations at a given historical moment. I intend to show in
my discussion of Carter’s later maturity of the 1980s and ‘90s that Carter’s music is still
distinctly modernist, despite changes in orientation and procedure within a largely postmodern
social context. In this light, Carter’s music of this period itself suggests that musical modernism,
at least for Carter, was still an open concept.

8

In this aspect we see Adorno’s Kantian influence, which wishes to hold onto the notion of a regulative concept
against the Hegelian thrust to resolve into his systemic totality. Generally speaking, Adorno’s understanding of
conceptual contradiction discussed in this section was informed by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, on which he
gave a series of lectures in 1959. See Adorno 2002c.
9
The issue in question is the possibility of modernist art under a postmodern cultural paradigm. For a classic
interpretation see Jameson 1991. For an excellent recent work on aesthetic autonomy under capitalism see Brown
2019.
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In sum, Adorno contends that “the concept is always both more and less than the elements
included in it” (Adorno 2008: 7), a dual point that is intended to prevent both the reduction of the
particularities of actual experience to the lesser concepts of thought and, conversely, to prevent
reducing the potentialities of thought to the actualities of the existing world. Only a negative
dialectics that pursues non-identity can move in both directions, both retain the motion of
Hegel’s dialectic and resist its affirmative synthesis. At the same time, it is a bulwark against
force of identity thinking, which attempts to freeze thought into equations of equivalence,
reinforced by the instrumental reason of modern society.

The Social Level
The latter point brings us to the second site of contradiction: the social world. So far we have
been discussing what Adorno refers to as the Subjective level, the side of thought. Adorno also
identifies contradiction in the world of experience itself, which he refers to as the Objective
side—that of actually existing society—which, as we will see, is the guarantor of the conceptual
contradictions briefly discussed above. It is important to recognize at the outset that the
contradictions of the Objective side are not logical contradictions of identity but dynamic
contradictions of opposing tendencies.

Adorno holds modern society to be antagonistic: “it is not a society with contradictions or despite
its contradictions, but by virtue of its contradictions” (Adorno 2008: 8-9). Lecturing in 1965, he
puts things baldly:
…today almost the entire [Western] economy can be sustained only because a very large
part of the social product is devoted to the production of weapons of mass destruction…
This means that the ability of our society to withstand [economic] crises, an ability that is
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generally held to be one of its finest achievements, is directly linked to the growth in its
potential for technological self-destruction. (Adorno 2008: 9)
This contradiction between the prosperity of postwar Keynesianism in America and, by
extension, postwar Europe, and its dependence on (and necessity to sustain) the means of its
complete destruction is one of the defining social antagonisms Adorno identifies in the postwar
world. This is the essential contradiction of Cold War “diplomacy” as such: peace sustained
through the threat of nuclear annihilation, or “mutually assured destruction,” which was of
course predicated on the development of a military industrial economy during “peacetime” far
beyond that which was required during WWII.

As we will see, Judith Stein (2010) is clear that it was this very contradiction, although framed
somewhat differently, that brought about the end of postwar prosperity in the United States. For
Stein, it was the latent contradiction between Cold War geopolitics and the demands of the
domestic economy that manifested in the economic crises of the 1970s and ultimate demise of
the postwar liberal consensus, which was partly responsible for that great economic stability to
which Adorno alludes above. As I will suggest below, the economic crises wrought by this
contradiction had a significant impact on the trajectory of Carter’s practice, which reached its
own material crisis in the 1970s as well.

Adorno generally expresses the contradictory tendency at the heart of modern society as the
dialectic of Enlightenment: the forces of civilization and progress are simultaneously the same
forces that move human society toward barbarism and destruction.10 The atomic age is a prime
10

This is an oversimplification. The core of the dialectic of Enlightenment is man’s will to dominate nature:
essentially, Western man’s impulse to free himself of myth and the chaos of the natural world was achieved in
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example of this dialectic. Centuries of scientific and technological advancement enabled Western
civilization to develop the knowledge and means necessary to split the atom; this was a
remarkable feat of physics, of man’s control of nature, but also undertaken in order to create a
weapon capable of destroying the same civilization in an historical instant. Adorno’s pithy line
from Negative Dialectics encapsulates this point precisely:
No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading
from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. (Adorno 2007: 320)
Since this this is a contradiction of tendencies—progressive and regressive—it can also be read
in reverse as well: the forces of destruction are simultaneously the same forces that move society
toward greater civilization. To dwell on this aspect of the dialectic for a moment, one could
consider also the outcome of the Second World War. The war required the United States to
rapidly develop and expand its productive capacity, which directly resulted in its post-war
economic boom; at the same time, the war itself destroyed the economies of most of the
industrialized world, uniquely positioning the United States as the world’s leading economy
thereafter. Broadly speaking, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the “Golden Age” of
American capitalism was predicated on the destruction of half the Western world. That the
United States profited from a trade surplus with Japan for almost three decades following their
surrender was arguably a direct result of the carnage the former’s two atomic bombs wrought on
the latter’s soil.

Enlightenment Reason. However, the Enlightenment reverts to myth: instrumental reason, positivism,
bureaucratization, the capitalist mode of production, and other reified institutions and habits of thought ultimately
freeze man and nature, otherwise dialectical concepts, into patterns and of domination. See Horkheimer and Adorno:
2002.
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I use this example underscore postwar social context that situates Carter’s stylistic shift in the
decade immediately following the War. As I will discuss below, this is apparent in the 1948
Sonata for Cello and Piano, a piece that signals not only the beginning of Carter’s maturity but
also the onset of the Cold War, if the installation of the Marshall Plan—both a benevolent aid to
rebuild Europe and a strategic attempt to contain future Soviet expansion—and of course the
USSR’s first successful nuclear test may serve as historical markers.

Adorno’s critique of the social world goes deeper than mere geopolitical commentary—it
includes a critique of the particular form of state-managed capitalism established after the war
and even the capitalist exchange relation itself.11 These issues, while important to consider for an
adequate interpretation of Carter’s aesthetics, are beyond the scope of the present discussion. The
larger point is that Adorno understands modern society—objective reality—as inherently
contradictory. Contradiction therefore has a “dual character,” it is both Subjective and Objective:
there is both “contradiction in the realm of ideas and concepts” and “the world itself is
antagonistic in its objective form”; for Adorno, “this dual character amounts to a kind of preestablished disharmony” (Adorno 2008: 9) between Subject and Object, mind and world,
individual and social, and, as we will soon see, composer and material, content and form, music
and society. Negative dialectics recognizes this, is oriented toward a critique of all claims to
identity, seeks instead the non-identical of the relation to concept and thing (often falsely
expressed as an equivalence relation), and recognizes that conceptual false identities are

11

The former is understood as a contradiction between highly advanced forces of production and regressive relations
of production. The latter contradiction is the false equivalency assumed in exchange masked by the money form, or
the “universal equivalent of exchange.” There is a wealth of literature on the contradictions of capital. David Harvey
succinctly outlines no less than seventeen. See Harvey: 2014.
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intertwined in the structure of reality itself. This latter point is especially crucial for my
interpretation of Carter’s aesthetics.

Against a “Unity of Opposites” in Carter’s Aesthetics
My outline of Adorno’s dialectics thus far is intended to prepare a theoretical foundation for my
interpretation of Carter’s aesthetics. To briefly summarize: Adorno’s dialectics recognizes that
there are fundamental contradictions at the core of both conceptual thought and existing social
reality. On the side of thought, the Subjective side, concepts employed are always either more or
less than their referents. Because of this, only a critical, negative dialectical motion of thought
committed to pursuing the non-identity of concept and referent can adequately grasp the issue at
hand—all other forms of reason lapse into “identity thinking,” assuming a false equivalence
between concept and referent, thought and world. While the former sees thought as process,
knowledge as becoming, the latter sees thought as static, knowledge as fixed.12

The Objective side, actually existing society, is also inherently contradictory. Since reality comes
before thought, a notion Adorno expresses as the “priority of the object,”13 the contradictions of
objective reality determine the contradictions of subjective thought, ensuring a fundamental
disharmony between Subject and Object. However, thought is also autonomous, spontaneous,
and therefore can be—for Adorno, must be—critical. Thought must be oriented to this
fundamental disharmony, must pursue the non-identical between concept and referent, mind and
world.

12

Adorno’s theory of experience is likewise dialectical—the distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis and their
relation to musical experience, specifically musical time, will be introduced and explored in Chapter Three.
13
For Adorno, the relation of Subject and Object is dialectical; it is also asymmetrical. He cleverly characterizes the
Object as “the what” and Subject as “the how.” See “On Subject and Object” in Adorno 1998c.
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This accounts for Adorno’s preference for a “negative” dialectics, which is oriented more toward
the moment of contradiction than Hegel’s Aufhebung, the moment where the contradiction is
passed through and beyond toward a higher level of harmony and resolution. In Adorno’s
dialectics, synthesis is more of an “expression of non-identity between thesis and antithesis”
(Adorno 2008: 30), the moment of negation that resists the affirmative pull of identity, which is
ideological and false because it promotes a premature harmony or “unity” between antagonisms
that are, in the last analysis, irreconcilable.

My interpretation of Carter’s aesthetics places Adorno’s negative dialectics at its core. I
understand the various oppositions in Carter as productive tensions that are not sublated in a
Hegelian sense—not passed through and beyond toward a higher level of aesthetic harmony—
but consciously laid bare as unreconciled (perhaps even irreconcilable) antagonisms. What is
most compelling about Carter’s music is the degree to which its antagonisms are confronted and
not resolved, the different ways in which the antagonisms of a given piece are not wholly
integrated by the totality, for example, or the tenuous relationship between schematic, abstract
formalizations and concrete, seemingly improvisational expressive gestures that abound in his
work.

Reviewing the Carter scholarship, it is apparent to me that an Adornian conception of dialectics
in Carter’s music is a shared, uncontroversial position, if unrecognized as such. Even Boland’s
masterful dissertation, which does recognize the value of Adorno’s thought in relation to Carter,
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shies away from committing to Adorno’s dialectics and opts for a quasi-Hegelian dialectics
instead. It is worth considering an important passage at length:
While Carter was in no way self-consciously a Hegelian… we may nonetheless examine
aspects of Carter’s aesthetic in this light…the notion of the unity of opposites pervades
the technical as well as programmatic aspects of Carter’s mature music… Unity of
opposites also manifests itself in specific techniques related to working with pitch and
interval aggregates, which Carter splits up to make unique contrasting musical identities
that are each other’s opposites (mutually exclusive yet sourced from a single origin)…
The unfolding, or form, of a Carter piece is in continual motion, flow, ‘becoming,’ where
the opposing sonorities interact and transform each other, never returning to a previous
sonic state, but nonetheless never entirely discarding or losing their identities. Carter’s
attitude towards the development of new musical form and material reflects a dialectical
model of progress: novelty that negates or denies its inheritance, or the re-use of past
forms and materials which ignores its contemporary context, fail to lead to a true new
music. Instead a dialectical approach requires music to build on inherited material and
forms incorporating and transforming the past in the new context of the present…
(Boland 2017: 16-7)
Boland here clearly understands the force of dialectics as such in Carter, is correct that many of
Carter’s pieces are committed to a mode of dialectical “becoming” over a static “being,” and
appropriately characterizes even Carter’s approach to composition as dialectical. However, her
reliance on a Hegelian conception of dialectics forces her ultimate evaluation to endorse the idea
of a “unity of opposites,” despite the fact that her excellent analyses pursue their disunity. While
it is fair to say that Carter’s music, particularly the work of his early maturity, is driven by
oppositions that are presented simultaneously, to say that these oppositions unified suggests a
degree of aesthetic harmonization that is achieved, albeit only in appearance, only in certain
works of his late period. My position is that the antagonisms in Carter are rarely sublated—the
oppositions in his music never entirely discard or lose their identities, to paraphrase Boland’s
insightful comment above—and an adequate interpretation of his aesthetics must therefore start
with an orientation toward the negative and the non-identical. To be blunt, an aesthetics of
Carter’s music must resist the urge to resolve antagonisms to the extent to which Carter’s music
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resists their harmonization itself; as Adorno’s negative dialectics stand in opposition to Hegel’s
positive dialectics, a proper aesthetics of Carter’s music must resist reading a unity of opposites
in his music.
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CHAPTER TWO
An Adornian Reading of Carter’s Sonata for Cello and Piano

I would like to consider the 1948 Sonata for Cello and Piano as the first example of negative
dialectics in Carter for a number of reasons. It is a very clear, relatively simple example of
unsublated antagonisms at the level of form in his music. It is also the first of Carter’s pieces to
self-consciously pursue and lay bare its material antagonisms, thereby entering the discourse of
modernism and (partially) breaking from his populist style of the 1930s and ‘40s. This is a
significant point for a dialectical interpretation of his aesthetics. While it is commonplace to
regard the Cello Sonata as representing the postwar Schoenberg-Stravinsky polemic (or
“answering,” as Daniel Guberman’s 2012 dissertation suggests—see below), I claim there are
deeper material tendencies associated with the opposed paragons of musical modernism
confronted in this piece that determine Carter’s compositional direction henceforth.1 As I will
eventually attempt to show, 1948 Cello Sonata is the germinal site of the key antagonisms of
Carter’s “first maturity” of the 1950s and ‘60s: it is here where Carter confronts the opposed
trajectories of (expressionist) Schoenberg and (neoclassical) Stravinsky, an actual material
dialectic—not a mere stylistic amalgamation—consciously taken-up in this piece and workedthrough over the course of each subsequent piece of the following decades.2 This will require a
consideration of Adorno’s Philosophy of New Music and his theory of the historical dialectic of
the musical material in order to establish, if not convincingly argue. Additionally, as Daniel
1

Simply put, I view Carter’s mature style as an ongoing attempt to sublate the material antagonisms presented
Schoenberg-Stravinsky polarity, which are the core antagonisms of musical modernism inherited by his generation.
My larger point is that Carter’s music comes closest to actualizing Adorno’s concept of a musique informelle.
Successfully arguing this point is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation.
2
Again, convincingly showing how the Schoenberg-Stravinsky dialectic is worked-through in Carter’s music of the
1950s and ‘60s requires a more substantial treatment than is possible here. I will attempt to pursue this in future
work.
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Guberman has shown, the Cello Sonata “speaks” to the Cold War context of Carter’s immediate
social world; to the extent to which this piece is a document of social mediation, in an Adornian
sense, is an issue I will also consider. One last reason for starting the Cello Sonata is that is a
clear example of the failure of aesthetic semblance in Carter’s music; the nature of semblance—
its success or failure—is a necessary theoretical point for framing the idea of aesthetic “unity” in
Carter’s music.

The Musical Antagonisms
Daniel Guberman (2012) presents an excellent analysis of the Cello Sonata’s first movement that
seriously pursues the suggestion, by Carter and others, that the opening movement is a conscious
stylistic evocation of Schoenberg and Stravinsky.3 He recognizes the influence of Schoenberg in
the cello’s quasi rubato expressive playing, its long, irregular phrases, and its dynamic shading,
while the piano’s motoric rhythm, irregular accents, consonant harmonies, and incisive
articulation suggest Stravinsky.4 Granted, these observations are apparent on the surface to any
informed listener. They are readily heard as “oppositions of character” (Boretz 1970: 18), per
Carter’s own suggestion, that, given the tenor of Schoenberg-Stravinsky debate in the late 1940s,
evoke enough of the respective composers styles for them to be identified as such.5 Guberman
situates the Cello Sonata in this discourse in an effort to argue that Carter is consciously
responding to this debate through his music. While I agree that this work is a site of a conscious
3

“At that time I was attracted by the idea of combining certain elements of Schoenberg’s music with elements of
Stravinsky: the irregularity of expression used by the former and the rhythmic base of the latter…I think it was most
successful in my Cello Sonata” (Restagno 1989: 36). Consider also a comment from Scheffer’s 2004 film
documentary: “…I finally wrote a cello sonata in which I tried, especially in the first movement, to have the piano
play the Stravinsky type of thing and the cello play the Schoenberg type of thing, which was a romantic kind of
thing against a clock-like rhythm in the piano” (Sheffer 2004).
4
Guberman mentions that the accentuation is similar to the Augurs of Spring. I hear an allusion to Stravinsky’s
neoclassical period, as I will discuss below.
5
See Guberman 2012: 28-36 for an examination of the postwar musical discourse with regard to Schoenberg and
Stravinsky. Guberman cites the 1948 issue of Partisan Review, in which this polemic was argued most fiercely.
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engagement with the legacies of Schoenberg and Stravinsky, I will suggest that it more than a
mere affirmation of “both” in response to the polemic—I will take care to underscore that the
confrontation of these opposing styles produces productive tensions that are best understood
from an Adornian perspective, both on the level of content and structure of the work as a whole.

Guberman identifies one Schoenbergian technique used to emphasize the cello’s association with
the composer: retaining pitch class order but altering rhythm and register, as seen with the
“restatement” of the cello’s opening (measures 6-16) in measures 23-32.

Example 2.1: Carter – Sonata for Cello and Piano (1948), Movement I.
Cello’s opening statement, measures 6-16:

Cello’s “restatement,” measures 23-32:

Guberman makes no comparison with a specific work of Schoenberg’s as such examples abound
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in the latter’s twelve-tone music of the 1930s and ‘40s.6

I would like to suggest a Stravinskian technique also observed in Guberman’s dissertation but
unrecognized as such, what I refer to as harmonic cross relation. Consider Stravinsky’s 1924
Piano Sonata as an example: the right and left hands consistently negate one another
harmonically, which is clearly evident in opening of the first theme of the first movement.

Example 2.2: Stravinsky – Piano Sonata (1924), Movement 1, measures 15-17.

In measures 15-17, the left hand arpeggiates three triads: B° - C - B° (irregularly with respect to
the downbeat). The right hand melody, however, suggests the inverse harmonic progression as it
rises through the C major scale in thirds: C - B° - C. Simply put, whenever C appears in the left
hand, it is contradicted with members of B° in the right, and vice versa. The rhythm and metrical
placement of the melody notes emphasizes the contradiction. For example, on the third beat of
measure 15, D (against an arpeggiated C major in the left and) is reconfirmed on the next
6

In an earlier draft I suggested that this was similar to Op. 23, No. 3, a transitional work wherein Schoenberg is
starting to explore systematic organizations of the basic harmonies he pursued more intuitively in his previous
expressionistic period. While convenient for my argument, the simpler, more straightforward allusion to
Schoenberg’s serial procedure is more convincing here. I nonetheless wish to underscore the significance of Carter’s
connection to Schoenberg’s expressionistic over serial music, along with Guberman, although not in an abstractly
“anti-serial” manner. I understand Carter’s mature style as taking up the harmonic issue of middle Schoenberg—the
problem of organizing basic sets of smaller cardinalities in a more systematic way—yet rationalizing it in a different
direction: Carter develops a systemization of the aggregate that is segmental and categorical, attendant to set-size
and interval content, but not serial, like Schoenberg’s total orderings. While beyond the scope of my dissertation, a
convincing Adornian aesthetics of Carter’s music must show how Carter’s approach to harmony in his mature
period can be understood as the “road not taken” out of Schoenberg’s middle period. I hope to pursue this idea in
future work.
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downbeat harmonized by a third, while the C-E third on the upbeat is treated as melodically
passing. Rhythmically, this passing third is unsynchronized with the accompaniment (a duple
against the running triplets), obscuring the fact that it is otherwise “consonant” with the
accompaniment. The upper third of the C major triad appears in the right hand on the upbeat to
measure 17, but is likewise heard as melodically dissonant, as neighbor tones to the same D-F
third reasserted on the next downbeat once more. It is also similarly unsynchronized with the
accompaniment. This third finally “arrives” as the melodic goal of the second phrase, and is thus
heard as melodically consonant, and yet the accompaniment undermines it, moving back to a B°
arpeggio after five whole beats of C major.

Guberman recognizes a seemingly similar harmonic cross relation—or harmonic contradiction—
in Carter’s Cello Sonata, although without tracing its Stravinskian lineage to the example I
suggest. Guberman states that throughout the first movement the “instruments converge
harmonically when viewed horizontally, often playing harmonic material similar to what the
other instrument had just played” (Guberman 2012: 46), a remark which, as I will soon show, is
more applicable to my Stravinsky example than Carter’s Sonata. Guberman’s annotated example
clearly shows the cross relation in the opening measures of Carter’s Sonata:
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Example 2.3: Carter - Cello Sonata, measures 6-8 (with Guberman’s annotations).7

I invoke Stravinsky’s example to demonstrate a subtle difference in these two kinds of harmonic
contradiction. On its face, Carter’s cross relation is conceptually similar to the technique found in
Stravinsky, although a step removed from the latter’s diatonic context, which I believe makes a
significant difference. Stravinsky often uses this technique in his neoclassic period to project
diatonicism while negating tonal harmonic function. The effect is to both suggest and disavow
tonality: it preserves the vocabulary of tonality, which is reinforced by the conscious evocation
of a quasi-Classical sonata, while neutralizing its grammar. In a Hegelian sense, it is an abstract
negation: tonality, as a concept, is negated, shown to be void of its content.8 In other words,
Stravinsky’s piece abstractly denies tonality, as if it is saying: “this is a not a tonal sonata,”
despite the fact that one is continually evoked—in this sense, it both calls to mind and negates its
own concept. On the other hand, Carter’s piece does not evoke tonality, despite the presence of
triads. Outside of a clear diatonic context, reinforced by the absence of a key signature (one of
the first of Carter’s movements to abandon it), and without the suggestion of tonal rhetoric or
7

See Guberman 2012: 49, annotations in original.
For Adorno, this is the regressive aspect of Stravinsky’s neoclassicism: appropriating past musical genres and
forms emptied of their historical content. I will comment more on Adorno’s critique of Stravinsky below.

8
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convention, Carter’s consonant intervals do not have the same harmonic implication as in
Stravinsky; nevertheless, the negative function of the C# in the above passage is still operant: it
is heard as a negation, denying the C major triad, but also succeeds in further determining the
distinction between the parts—and styles. It should therefore be understood as a determinate
negation, a negation that particularizes, makes specific and actual. It is not an abstract “not,” but
a “not” that renders the antagonisms in the music concrete. Understood this way, Carter’s
determinate negation raises important implications for the issue of “convergence” that Guberman
interprets in this passage (an the piece).

That the C# appears first in the cello, against the piano’s C triad, and then in the piano, against
the cello’s arpeggiation of C’s distinctive third (inverted in the music), suggests to Guberman
that that the two instruments “convergence harmonically,” yet at different times. This reading
would make more sense if applied to the Stravinsky example: the diatonic context and the
conscious projection of the attendant stylistic conventions in Stravinsky’s Sonata do suggest that
the hands are temporally unsynchronized, that the whole scenario is a distortion of an imagined
norm wherein we would otherwise hear the two hands harmonically converge. In the Carter
Sonata, however, there is no clear sense that the cello implies a C major triad after one appears in
the piano. We do not hear the same harmonies “out of joint,” as in the Stravinsky example, but
only the same notes and intervals determined differently according to their respective stylistic
identities. In actuality, the E-C in the cello is better heard as the continuation of a gesture that
begins with the low C# held through the previous measure; it is better understood as a melodic
unfolding of a (013) trichord that emphasizes the span of a major seventh from C# to the higher
C. This conceptualization is more consistent with the Schoenbergian style projected by the other
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elements of the cello part mentioned above. The apparent cross relation is rather a result of a
particular musical scenario that is constructed to suggest that the two parts are pursuing different
ends with different norms in mind. That they harmonically negate each other at a given moment
can be read both as a product of their opposed norms and, in a dialectical sense, as also
determining them as oppositions. This moment, in Adornian terms, is a moment of harmonicstylistic non-identity, or a determinate negation without sublation—the contradiction is distinct
and mutually determining but without synthesis, wherein both would be transformed on a higher
level in the form of a unified and consistent whole.

Guberman’s analysis is otherwise sensitive to the dialectical nature of the harmonic process in
this piece, and his impulse to forego a conventional set class analysis speaks to this. A set class
analysis reduces all simultaneities to basic set forms, suggesting harmonic identity. From an
Adornian standpoint, this would be a violation of the particular: set classes are reductive
concepts that mask the particularity of the musical phenomenon at hand. While appropriate in
some contexts, it would obscure the very particular harmonic-stylistic dissonance that Carter
carefully crafts in the first movement of the Cello Sonata. A set class label of [0147] in mm. 7
would hide the significance of C# in the cello as an opposition to the C major triad arpeggiated
in the piano part. Guberman prefers a harmonic analysis that underscores the antagonisms of the
parts and the particular kind of dissonance they project, correctly summarizing Carter’s harmonic
principle thusly: “triads in the piano are accompanied by a semitone related pitch in the cello”
(Guberman 2012: 48). In fact, this is precisely how we hear the harmonic process of this piece:
triads in the piano, which are consistent with Stravinsky’s neoclassicism, are contradicted by
semitones in the cello, consistent with Schoenberg’s chromaticism.
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Incidentally, the issue with set class analysis obscuring particularities works in the other
direction as well—it ignores significant lexical commonalities among “sets” it would otherwise
treat as different. Guberman identifies this a footnote to his observation above:
This is another area where I feel traditional set theory approaches are insufficient, as they
do not recognize the commonality between these sonorities which fall under multiple
distinct labels: [0137], [0147], [0148], [0158], and [0347]. (Guberman 2012: 48, fn. 52)
Essentially, these sets, all of which appear in Carter’s Sonata, are functionally equivalent within
the context of the piece: they are better understood as triads—chords—with an “alien” note
superimposed a half-step away from one of the chord tones.9

Carter’s preference throughout his life for referring to his harmonies as “chords” opposed to
“sets” lends insight into how simultaneities are construed in his music. In general, as I will
explore with a later example in Chapter Four, there is a tension in certain works of Carter’s
between the tendency to understand sonorities as abstract equivalent sets versus as unique chords
with particular voicings that should be taken as concretely as they appear.

The issue of “enharmonic dissonance,” as Guberman calls it, in Carter’s Cello Sonata
underscores this ambiguity, and is worth considering for its illumination of Adorno’s
characterization of Schoenberg and Stravinsky. As Guberman has observed:
Carter frequently spells pitches so that harmonic consonances become dissonances as
augmented or diminished intervals. Neither instrument retains consistent accidentals.
Instead, the two often switch with one instrument playing sharps while the other plays
flats, a phenomenon I call enharmonic dissonance. (Guberman 2012: 48)
9

Labeling each verticality with one or another of the aforementioned set types would be as useful here as a Roman
numeral analysis.
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Guberman interprets the phenomenon of reading dissonance while hearing consonance as a
metaphor for Carter reading about the divergences between Schoenberg and Stravinsky while
hearing “correspondences” in their music. I prefer to understand this as another site of
contradiction and divergence, that between the tonal system, where enharmonic pitches are
functionally different, and a further systemic rationalization, like serialism, which must assume
enharmonic equivalence. This opposition is represented by the two aforementioned composers,
although not as they are conventionally understood. To explain, it is better to first consider the
issue from a perspective of identity and non-identity, which has different implications for the two
instruments at hand. For the piano, identity is unavoidable at the level of pitch and spelling;
however, the cello can bring out nuances of pitch deviation, playing flats slightly flatter and
sharps slightly sharper for expressive purposes and, in effect, denying enharmonic equivalence.
In essence, each part has a different relationship with respect to its own pitch material—the cello
may deviate, take the spelling of accidentals as expressive cues (as is customary in the tradition
of quartet playing), while the piano can only articulate the equal tempered chromatic, regardless
of spelling. The cello can pursue the non-identical with respect to pitch while the piano actually
reinforces the identity of different enharmonic spellings. A performance approach that takes this
into consideration could further emphasize the opposition of the parts, which is justified by
Carter’s instrumental “casting” of the characters: Schoenberg’s expressionistic cello against
Stravinsky’s objectivistic piano.10

10

It should be noted that the instruments that Carter uses to represent each composer were literally their primary
instruments: Schoenberg was first a cellist, Stravinsky both performed on and famously composed at the piano. This
fact is not incidental, especially in Stravinsky’s case: it is commonly known that the piano in Stravinsky’s
composing studio was muted; by stripping as much character away from the instrument as possible, Stravinsky
could approximate the “pure” sound he needed for composing. His preference for a de-particularized, objective
sound reinforces Adorno’s appraisal of him as an “objectivistic” composer, seeking pure musical abstractions. I will
discuss this further below.
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At first glance, this may appear as an odd distribution of concept to style character, considering
how Schoenberg is most associated with 12-tone serialism, which assumes enharmonic
equivalence, while Stravinsky is most associated with diatonicism, in which the non-identity of
enharmonics would allegedly still be operant. However, the inverse is true from an Adornian
standpoint. In Philosophy of New Music, Adorno presents Schoenberg and Stravinsky as the
modern representatives of the core opposing tendencies in the dialectic of Western music:
progressive rationalization, the Objective thrust, that pushes toward greater rationalization of
the musical material as opposed to the mimetic impulse, the Subjective thrust, that seeks not to
control but express. This is another way of characterizing the dialectic of Enlightenment: the
impulse to rationalize, to master nature, as seen in the domination of the concept and
instrumental reason, versus the non-identical, the moment of irreducible experience and the
autonomous quality of Subjectivity that is particular and free. For the purposes of his argument,
it is Schoenberg’s expressionistic period that most closely embodies the mimetic impulse in its
“direct registering of human suffering” and intuitive, almost unmediated, “free” atonalism. On
the other hand, Stravinsky’s neoclassicism is a kind of positivism that appropriates past musical
genres and forms and empties them of their historical content in search of an expressionless,
objective music.11 I suggest that the two different ways conceptualizing accidentals in Carter’s
piece is supported by Adorno’s characterization—taking the cello part as expressionistic
Schoenberg, wherein accidentals pursue the non-identity of enharmonic “equivalents,” and the
piano part as objectivistic Stravinsky, wherein accidentals reinforce enharmonic identity.

11

Granted, Adorno’s appraisal of Stravinsky in Philosophy of New Music is undialectical as compared to his
presentation of Schoenberg, a fact which Adorno admitted and attempted to remedy in “Stravinsky: a Dialectical
Portrait” years later (see Adorno 1998d). Furthermore, his argument more convincingly shows that Schoenberg’s
music itself embodies the dialectic of Enlightenment in its move toward progressive rationalization with twelve-tone
serialism.
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Although Guberman’s idea of “enharmonic dissonance” and his analysis of Carter’s harmonies
hardly require justification, he explains his method recourse to the Charles Seeger’s concept of
“dissonant counterpoint,” the final technical issue I will consider in relation to Adorno’s negative
dialectics.12
I propose an analysis based on consonance and dissonance, which I expand to include a
variety of musical features beyond pitch. I take Charles Seeger’s idea of dissonant
counterpoint as a conceptual basis for exploring how to compare levels of consonance
and dissonance in these other aspects of music. (Guberman 2012: 44-45)
By expanding the notion of consonance and dissonance “beyond pitch,” Guberman sees the
implication of Seeger’s idea: the notion that dissonance as such “could relate to other musical
parameters including rhythm, timbre, and dynamics” (Guberman 2012: 45). This brings us to an
important aesthetic insight, that “degrees of similarity and difference [can represent] consonance
and dissonance, respectively” (ibid). Again, I would like to reframe this in Adornian terms:
consonance and dissonance are indeed dialectical notions—in that they are each taken as distinct
and are also both mutually determinate—that align with identity and non-identity. Simply put,
identity is conceptually harmonious, while non-identity discordant. Since we already have these
ideas in our Adornian toolbox, it is unnecessary to expand the concept consonance and dissonant
beyond pitch; we can continue to explore the non-identical in other parameters of the Cello
Sonata without the risk of over-mining the concept of dissonance.

As I have suggested, it is the antagonistic thrust of the non-identical that animates the “harmony”
in this movement, which both produces and is produced by the “two completely different planes

12

Guberman cites Charles Seeger’s article in Modern Music, “On Dissonant Counterpoint” which was included in
Henry Cowell’s 1930 New Musical Resources, “a book that Carter has often cited as important in the development
of his musical thought” (Guberman 2012: 44).
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of musical character” (Boretz 1970: 18). Carter brings together here. As we are about to see,
formal non-identity characterizes not only the first movement, but also the work as a whole. In
my final section I will trace this concept further in order to both illustrate the failure of aesthetic
semblance in this work and its implications for an understanding both its socio-historical context
and ramifications for Carter’s mature style.

The Formal Whole and Aesthetic Semblance
In this brief final section I will consider the Cello Sonata in relation to the concept of aesthetic
semblance (Schein), or the appearance of a harmonious, organic totality in great works of art.

According to Adorno, “successful” works, works totally committed to the immanent logic of
their form, appear as harmonious and complete, take on an auratic character that is almost
metaphysical in quality—i.e. above material reality—and no longer appear as products of human
labor.13 (Music is especially suited to this because of its apparent non-materiality, at least
compared to the plastic arts—it s apparent immediacy.) However, even in works that closely
attain semblance, there is a moment of failure. Simply put, although they appear as autonomous
and complete, they are still formed by historically-mediated labor working with historicallymediated material—there is no possibility of attaining the Absolute, in Hegelian terms, given the
antagonisms and contradictions that Adorno identified. The work can only approximate a
harmonious totality through its form, in its mediation of part and whole, and only achieves a

13

For Benjamin’s concept of the “aura” see “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in Benjamin
1968.
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semblance of immediacy if it can hide its truth as mediation.14 When a work approaches this
aesthetic vanishing point, it appears to transcend materiality; however, the truth is that its very
materiality—hidden through mediation—undergirds the appearance of its immateriality.15 The
mediated nature of the apparently immediate in the work of art is what Adorno attempts to
underscore here in the Dialectic of Enlightenment:
The moment in the work of art by which it transcends reality cannot, indeed be severed
from style; that moment, however, does not consist in achieved harmony, in the
questionable unity of form and content, inner and outer, individual and society, but in
those traits in which the discrepancy emerges, in the necessary failure of the passionate
striving for identity. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 103)
Following Adorno, I understand the striving for identity of style as one in the same with striving
for an identity of form and content in Carter’s Cello Sonata. In both cases, I believe this striving
ends in failure, which expresses the disharmony of both the material tradition that Carter is
invoking—the discourse of musical modernism as represented Schoenberg and Stravinsky—and
the work’s own social situation—the onset of the Cold War and nuclear “diplomacy.”16

The Cello Sonata, from a stylistic perspective, is inconsistent, despite its efforts to hide this
fact.17 The first movement is stylistically inconsistent in its form: if taken as a whole, the quasicadenza middle section, measures 68-104, wherein Guberman notes the instruments finally
“converge,” actually represents a departure from the “two planes of musical characters” that

14

“Form refutes the view that art works have immediate being. They do not. They owe their existence to form,
which is therefore their mediator. The objective condition of their being reflected in themselves” (Adorno 1998a:
208).
15
As Hegel has shown: through mediation, mediation itself disappears. See Hegel 2010: 44-57.
16
Also, the Cello Sonata falls short of achieving a degree of aesthetic semblance that some of his later more, abstract
works of the 1950s and ’60s, approximate more closely—although they also fail, if more subtly.
17
Carter’s well-known Joycean justification for the apparent “circularity” of the Sonata, leaving off where it began,
and the minor third figures that serve as connective tissue adjoining the beginning and ends of the middle
movements strikes me more as late-stage attempts to hide the work’s overall inconsistency rather than immanent
ideas that adequately worked-through from conception to completion.
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bookend it: the instruments converge in character and in content, pursue a unity—or common
identity—but this is heard contextually as a retreat from the stability of the antagonistic
coexistence established in the opening. Formally speaking, this entire “convergence” section is
actually a divergence from the norm established at the onset of the piece. To use Adornian
terminology, while Sections A (measures 6-67) and A’ (measures 105-129) pursue the nonidentical, as explored above, the middle section strives for identity but fails to achieve it. It is
rhetorically “dissonant” compared to the opening stalemate.18 Therefore, the movement as a
whole presents these antagonisms as unreconciled and perhaps irreconcilable, as the trajectory of
the work as a whole suggests.

In the context of the work as a whole, one cannot help but hear the middle section as an “echo”
of the other movements, particularly the second, which presents a greater degree of unity
between cello and piano than heard in the opening movement. The notion of an “echo” of things
to come makes sense if we consider the order in which the movements were composed: II, III,
IV, and I. Even if the listener had not known the order of composition, it is immediately evident
that the sprightly second movement is in Carter’s earlier, populist style, which is jarring in its
stylistic contrast following the first movement. Only over the course of the subsequent
movements is this stylistic incongruence mitigated—movement three moves a degree closer
toward the dissonant, antagonistic character established in movement one, and movement four
can be read as a frantic, accelerating drive back towards it, reinforced by the first movement’s

18

This interpretation is contrary to Guberman’s: “The B section offers a different version of the narrative by having
each instrument perform a solo, but again results in a convergence. Therefore, I see the entire movement revolving
around a narrative of convergence between the two characters, showing that each may maintain its own style while
adopting characteristics from the other. When read through the debates concerning Stravinsky and Schoenberg, I
believe that the composition reveals one of Carter’s earliest attempts to express in music that which he felt he could
not in words” (Guberman 2012: 42, emphasis mine).
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return at the end of the piece. That the instruments switch characters at the end of movement four
should not be understood as another convergence—rather, the fundamental antagonism between
styles, the two “completely different planes” of music are still intact, it’s more like the “world”
of the piece has been turned upside down.19

In essence, I understand the “whole” of the Cello Sonata as a fractured one, a totality that resists
aesthetic semblance because its existence as mediation is laid bare; its inconsistencies—which
are legitimate antagonisms on a both material and social level at the particular moment in
Carter’s development—are worked-through but not resolved. In this regard, it is dialectical in an
Adornian sense: its antagonisms, particularly the antagonism of style, are not sublated on a
higher level, but laid bare as unresolved. I claim that stylistic contradiction, as an idea, points
toward the Adornian “truth content” of Carter’s Cello Sonata. If we take Adorno’s claim
seriously that the formal discrepancies in a work—their moments of non-identity—reveal the
truth of their social mediation, I would suggest a few possible interpretations of the “truth” in the
discrepancies I have identified in the Cello Sonata:20

First, the inherent antagonisms in the legacy of European musical modernism as represented by
Schoenberg and Stravinsky as such, the conflicting aesthetic issues they both present and attempt
to solve, and the conflicting issues they raise about the appropriate direction of New Music in the
postwar era. This issue has been masterfully explored in Adorno’s work, beginning with

19

This is another divergence from Guberman’s interpretation: “…ultimately having the two instruments switch
parts, allows the sonata to parallel a post-war vision of America that welcomed numerous émigrés, and promised the
possibility of merging their culture with America’s to create a new culturally and politically ascendant superpower
that embraced the past while looking into the future” (Guberman 2012: 42).
20
“Form is the non-repressive synthesis of diffuse particulars; it preserves them in their diffuse, divergent, and
contradictory condition. Form is therefore an unfolding of truth” (Adorno 1998c: 207).
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Philosophy of New Music and spanning though his late essays and lectures on New Music. As I
have suggested, one can read Carter’s Cello Sonata as a musical analogue to the former.

Second, the problem of reconciling the influences Schoenberg and Stravinsky in Carter’s own
stylistic development, first and most consciously addressed in this piece. The ramifications of
this stylistic confrontation and its resonances in Carter’s mature style will be an issue I will
suggest in the final chapter and explore in more detail in future work.

Third, a repudiation of Carter’s own populist style and American populist music in general.
Carter has often spoken of this in interviews himself:
Many people felt—and I certainly was one of them (perhaps not rightly)—that the whole
German cult of hypertrophic emotion could have been held responsible for the kind of
disaster we were witnessing then in front of our noses (certainly Brecht came to hold this
view). This is why, in my opinion, many of us became interested for a time in
neoclassicism as a way of ‘returning to reason’ and to a more moderate point of view
about expression, as well as to a more accessible vocabulary. After a while, though,
before the end of the Second World War, it became clear to me, partly as a result of
rereading Freud and others and thinking about psychoanalysis, that we were living in a
world where this physical and intellectual violence would always be a problem and that
the whole conception of human nature underlying the neoclassic esthetic amounted to a
sweeping under the rug of things that, it seemed to me, we had to deal with in a less
oblique and resigned way. (Edwards 1972: 32)
In this comment we can see the resemblances of Adorno’s argument in Philosophy of New
Music, that Stravinsky’s neoclassicism was aesthetically irresponsible after the travesty of
WWII. Carter here mentions Brecht, who was also very much concerned with the idea of
aesthetic responsibility; Adorno offers a helpful categorization of the issue in his 1932 essay “On
the Social Situation of Music” that places Brecht as a representative of music that is socially
conscious, critical, and yet stylistically heteronomous. In Adorno’s theory, music that is both

39

critical and autonomous, despite not being overtly socially conscous, can most adequately
register the antagonisms of the social world and reach a higher sense of aesthetic responsibility.21
I read Carter’s comment above as consistent with this view.

Lastly, I suggest that one could read the Cello Sonata as document of the onset of the Cold War.
Although impossible to “prove,” it is nonetheless fruitful to suggest that the Cello Sonata would
not have been written in a world that was not becoming deadlocked in a seemingly irresolvable
antagonism between nuclear-armed power blocks. It is not coincidental that this work coincides
with the installation of the Marshall Plan—both benevolent aid to rebuild Europe and a strategic
attempt to contain Soviet expansion—and of course the USSR’s first successful nuclear test.
Admittedly, this suggests issues of interpretation that are far beyond the scope of my discussion,
although I will attempt to address certain related points in my more in-depth consideration of
Adorno’s theory of mediation and my own socio-historical periodization of Carter’s music in my
final chapter.

21

I will discuss the importance of aesthetic autonomy in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER THREE
The “Matter of Time” in Carter: Philosophical Perspectives

The Matter of Time
Any technical or aesthetic consideration of music must start with the matter of time. The
basic problem has always been that analysts of music tend to treat its elements as static
rather than as what they are—that is, transitive steps from one formation in time to
another. All the materials of music have to be considered in relation to their projection in
time, and by time, of course, I mean not visually measured ‘clock-time’ but the medium
through which (or way in which) we perceive, understand, and experience events. Music
deals with this experiential kind of time and its vocabulary must be organized by a
musical syntax that takes direct account of, and thus can play on, the listener’s time
sense… (Carter, quoted in Edwards 1972: 90)
When dealing with the nature of musical time in Carter commentators generally resort to poetic
metaphor (Schiff 1983), no doubt encouraged by Carter’s engagement with modernist literature,
or otherwise attempt to explicate time’s “meaning” in Carter’s music by means of a general
survey of the assorted philosophical speculations Carter alludes to in his essays (Bernard 1995).
While many of these ideas and interpretations are suggestive, the scholarship has yet to develop
an interpretation of Carter’s unique sense of musical time that connects the speculative and the
musical levels, those of theory and of practice. I wish work towards a theory of temporality in
Carter’s music that responds to Carter’s philosophical influences but is also capable of speaking
to Carter’s actual formal-rhythmic practice. I understand this chapter as laying the groundwork
for such a theory, which requires an evaluation and critique of certain philosophical concepts that
appear in Carter’s thought. At the risk of going over trodden territory, it is worth using Carter’s
“Music and the Time Screen” (1976) as a point of departure. I will discuss the germinal concepts
in this essay, particularly those of Henri Bergson and Suzanne Langer, before introducing a
materialist reinterpretation of them as informed by both Adorno and Jonathan Martineau’s
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(2016) reading of temporality as material process under capitalism. While I will not be able to
fully develop a theory of temporality in Carter’s music that is grounded in his technical practice,
I will suggest a conceptual framework for understanding the particular way in which Carter
uniquely approaches the issue of temporal organization in his music and also the dialectical
nature of his practice, which develops into new forms over the course of his output. I ultimately
understand the development of his temporal approach as being mediated by the broad socioeconomic shifts of postwar American society. This latter point is well beyond the scope of this
chapter, but I nonetheless hope to suggest some fruitful ideas worth pursuing toward this end in
my final chapter.

Bergson and Duration
He said something to the effect that ‘time is the canvas on which you consider music to
be presented, just as the spatial canvas of a painting furnishes the surface on which a
painting is presented.’ Such a provocative comparison reaches in so many directions that
it is difficult to discuss it in some clear and intelligible way. (Carter 1998: 262)
Carter admits that, while the comparison between musical time and a canvas is “provocative,” it
is nonetheless “superficial, if not pointless, because we experience these dimensions in such
different although interconnected ways” (Carter 1968: 262). What is interesting for him about the
analogy is the manner of presentation, or music’s “projection in time”: a “stretch of measurable
time of practical life”—i.e. the time of the listening experience—serving as a “screen” for the
presentation of music, itself an image of “another kind of time” (ibid).1

1

As we will see below, this particular phrasing is indebted to Suzanne Langer, whom Carter cites as specifically as
being “illuminating on these matters” (Carter 1998: 263). An examination of her work in connection to Carter is
hitherto absent in the scholarship.
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The analogy is limited, as Carter correctly notes, because of the “incomparability” of the
experience of time and the experience of space; even with moving pictures, while we experience
them in real time, a film is primarily visual; music, on the other hand, is primarily auditory.
Carter’s observation about the supposed incommensurability of time and space is indebted to
Henri Bergson, alluded to but not discussed in Carter’s essay, whose influential ideas about time
and experience are worth exploring in detail.

For Bergson, we are confronted by two different realities:
One is heterogeneous, the realm of sensible qualities. The other is homogeneous, which is
space. This, strictly conceived by human intelligence, lets us make clear distinctions, lets
us count and abstract, and perhaps even speak. (Bergson 1950: 97)
In other words, the world as construed by the intellect appears as a homogeneous realm of
quantity and measure, while lived experience tells us it is heterogeneous and fundamentally
qualitative. While we understand the world spatially, discretely, we “feel” only intensities of
different degrees and of different kinds. For Bergson, these sense impressions are entirely prereflective, or prior to cognition. Only when we reflect upon experience do we rationalize our
impressions objectively. This act of determining quantifiable differences leads us away from the
dynamic sensations of the world as it is intuitively registered by the mind.

Essentially, in the interest of holding fast to the sensuous quality of immediate experience,
Bergson’s phenomenology argues for a strict division between what is otherwise known as
intuition and reflective reason. Bergson believed that ontological and epistemological mistakes
are made when we don’t recognize that we objectify, or “spatialize” experience—and especially
the experience of time—in reflective thought, when we “borrow” ideas about time from the
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rational mind and impress them upon the otherwise dynamic sensations of experience. As
Bergson explains:
…let us notice that when we speak of time, we generally think of a homogeneous
medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space, so as
to form a discrete multiplicity… [but] does the multiplicity of our conscious states bear
the slightest resemblance to the multiplicity of the units of a number? Has true duration
anything to do with space?... For if time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a
medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being
counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in
space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time,
understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing
but space? …[This confirms the opinion] that we are compelled to borrow from space the
images by which we describe what the reflective consciousness feels about time and even
about succession; it follows that pure duration is something different. (Bergson 1950: 9091)
Bergson offers the concept of duration (temps durée) to correct our mistaken notion of
experiential time as measurable, i.e. spatial (temps espace). He argues that reality as it is
experienced intuitively is a temporal realm of pure quality, or pure duration. Furthermore,
Bergson holds that reality is experience intuited; it is comprised of complex of purely subjective
phenomena that have nothing in common with the properties of the extended world of space as
construed by reflective reason. True reality, as we experience it, is a dynamic “confused
multiplicity”—as in fused together: con-fused (verses the “discrete multiplicity” mentioned
above). It is durée: “the form taken by the succession of our inner states of consciousness when
our self lets itself live, when it abstains from establishing a separation between the present state
and anterior states” (Bergson 1950: 100).

It is not only a mistake to think of time with number, it is an epistemological blunder: “in
invading the series of our psychological states, in introducing space into our conception of
duration, [measured time] corrupts, at their very source, our representations of external change
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and internal change, of movement and of freedom” (Bergson 1950: 74). The objectification of
time as quantity is the foundational error that distorts how we understand both our inner
experience and the external world; therefore, subjective experience must be separated from the
reflective conceptualization of objects. This must start with time as duration, which cannot be
objectively symbolized but only intuitively felt. In a sense, we must throw out the clock if we are
to intuit reality concretely as the dynamic, con-fused multiplicity that it is.

In sum, Bergson identifies a contradiction between two senses of time: temps durée versus temps
espace. The former is the dynamic, qualitative experience of lived, subjective time—to which
Carter refers as “experiential time”—and the latter is the rationalized, quantitative aspect of
measured, objective time—Carter’s “clock time.” The first movement of Carter’s Cello Sonata
most clearly represents these two senses of time, albeit metaphorically.2

While Bergson’s work is important for underscoring the contradiction between temps durée and
temps espace, he mistakenly placed “truth” on the side of temps durée, indicting temps espace as
a false abstraction. Herein lies the issue with Bergson’s thought for the a theory of temporality in
music—Bergson’s hard distinction between time as subjectively intuited and time as objectively
construed leaves no room for composed music, which relies on the kinds of temporal
abstractions Bergson would reject as false. As we will see below, Suzanne Langer criticizes this
aspect of Bergson’s philosophy. In an attempt to preserve Bergson’s core insights into the nature
of lived time, she extends Bergson’s theory with a third realm, the “virtual,” wherein symbolic

2

On first glance, the “clock time” projected in the piano contradicts the more fluid, expressively nuanced kind of
time suggested in the cello, but in actuality the two are both metrically determined quite exactly in the score.
According to Bergson the musical score would be considered an abstraction, or “spatialization,” of time, particularly
the highly rationalized polyrhythmic procedures Carter develops in his mature period.
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representation can capture the nature of temps durée without the reductive abstractions of
reflective reason.

Langer and the Virtual
Carter does not discuss Bergson’s durée, but he does mention the otherwise little known critic
and composer Charles Koechlin, who includes Bergson’s concept in his four “aspects” of time—
duration, psychological time, measured time, and musical time. While these concepts have been
discussed in the Carter scholarship since Carter’s essay (particularly in Bernard 1995), it has yet
to be observed that almost the entire Koechlin passage Carter quotes appears as a footnote in
Suzanne Langer’s Feeling and Form (1953).3

Langer was one of the foremost mid-century American aestheticians whose influential work,
Philosophy in a New Key (1948), erected a unique and ambitious theory of symbolic “meaningmaking” with symbolism as its cornerstone; her Feeling and Form takes this as a point of
departure for building a theory of art founded on the “virtual” as a distinct realm of symbolic
representation specifically suited to aesthetic experience. Carter not only amply cites Langer in
his essay, but his thought on time in music is strikingly consistent with hers, as we will soon see.

Bergson is crucial for Langer because, “metaphysically, he deals with matters that go to the core
of all the arts, and especially of music” (Langer 1953: 114): the perception of lived experience
3

Koechlin is not discussed directly, but is his four “aspects” of time (or “concepts,” as Langer says), are provided in
a footnote. Note that Langer’s passage on measured time versus durée is the passage Carter cites (Carter 1997: 2645). Considering the importance of Langer and relative visibility of her work in the 1950s and 1960s (as compared to
Koechlin, a relatively obscure composer—virtually unknown outside of France—whose essay was published in
1926), and of course her indelible influence on Carter specifically, I assume that Carter was referred to Koechlin’s
discussion from Langer’s text. Regardless, Carter undoubtedly consulted the source in the original French, as his
footnote indicates. See Carter 1997: 263.
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and its fundamental nature as duration. However, Langer criticizes Bergson for rejecting all
forms of “symbolizations” in his bifurcation between intuition and reason. For Langer, Bergson’s
“horror” at the concept of measured time as a pernicious abstraction from lived experience, and
his deduction that all temporal concepts are therefore inherently fraudulent and false, prevented
him from seeing that there are forms of symbolic experience that do not betray our “real
knowledge” of lived experience: namely, art.

Langer contends that art inhabits the realm of Bergson’s durée and that music, particularly,
presents an image of lived time most free from the abstractions he rejected:
The realm in which tonal entities move is a realm of pure duration…radically different
from the time in which our public and practical life proceeds…Musical duration is an
image of what might be termed ‘lived’ or ‘experienced’ time—the passage of life that we
feel as expectations become ‘now,’ and ‘now’ turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is
measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions, and emotions; and it has not merely a
different measure, but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time.
The semblance of this vital, experiential time is the primary illusion of music. (Langer
1953: 109)
The “direct experience of passage” (Langer 1953: 113) is the crucial element of durée, which
Langer observes is precisely what music presents, albeit as a “sonorous image of passage”—a
line that Carter himself quotes in his essay. Langer’s position is that music offers an image of
“virtual time” which is determined by the symbolic forms produced in the movement of sound,
and, despite not being “actual,” it captures and presents the character of lived experience
Bergson theorized without the reductions of reflective consciousness.4

4

“The direct experience of passage, as it occurs in each individual life, is, of course, something actual… The
primary illusion of music is the sonorous image of passage, abstracted from actuality to become free and plastic and
entirely perceptible” (Langer 1953: 113). I will problematize the idea of music as merely an image of passage, a
symbol of “actual” lived experience—and not enmeshed in actually lived experience—below. It is also important to
recognize that Langer’s formulation here resembles Adorno’s non-conceptual and mimetic faculty, which also will
be explored below. Note that the second line of this Langer quote is included in Carter 1997: 265.
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In support of her theory as it pertains to music Langer introduces remarks from the
aforementioned Charles Koechlin’s “Le temps et la music” in Le Revue Musicale (1926), and
also Gabriel Marcel’s “Bergsonisme et musique” in the same issue. Both authors accept
Bergson’s durée, contending that “direct intuition of time must be our measure for philosophical
conception,” and both authors recognize what Bergson ignored: “that his ‘concrete’ duration,’
‘lived time,’ is the prototype of ‘musical time,’ namely passage in its characteristic forms”
(Langer 1953: 115). For Langer, Marcel and Koechlin are able to use Bergson’s durée as a
model for musical time because they “both [correctly] distinguish between actual and musical
duration, the living reality and the symbol” (Langer 1953: 116):
As soon as we regard music as a thoroughgoing symbol, an image of subjective time, the
appeal of Bergson’s ideas to the artistic mind becomes quite comprehensible; for music
presents reality no more directly than philosophical discourse, but it presents a sentient
and emotional reality more adequately in a non-discursive image… (Langer 1953: 118)
Langer’s distinction between the “actual” and the “virtual” is theoretically necessary to both hold
onto Bergson’s conception of durée as the of realm direct aesthetic perception and allow for the
possibility for of art to draw upon aspects of thought that Bergson relegates solely to reflective
reason. Langer’s non-discursive images are supposedly halfway between the reductive concepts
of reason and the immediate, pre-reflective “felt” experience of intuition, and they perform the
work of “meaning-making” in the symbolic, virtual dimension of music and art in her theory. I
will take issue with this aspect of Langer in my discussion of Adorno’s theory of experience
below, which offers a more convincing, dialectical conception of the relation between intuition
and reason that Langer unconvincingly attempts to bridge with her notion of the virtual and nondiscursive symbols. For the time being, it should be clear that Langer ultimately accepts
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Bergson’s duality, places her virtual realm within Bergson’s durée, but argues that this
“symbolic dimension” has its own forms of logic irreducible to those of reflective reason.

For Langer, music opens Bergson’s durée to more than just the character of lived time as
intuitively felt. She cites Marcel on this point: “it is of the very essence of [music’s] form to
reveal itself as duration, and yet to transcend, in its own way, the purely temporal order in which
it is manifested” (quoted in Langer 1953: 116-117), into other “orders,” as she concludes, like
the spatial dimension, which Bergson doesn’t permit. Koechlin affirms this in a statement
omitted in Langer’s footnote, but quoted by Carter:
[Musical time] appears to have some connection with space in that it seems to us
measurable (by ear). The divisions embodied in musical note-values (whole-notes, halfnotes, etc.) lead to a spatialization of time very different of that (based on vision) which
Bergson talks about. (Carter 1997: 263)
Langer likely excludes this part of Koechlin’s comment regarding musical time because it is
inconsistent with how musical “space” is conceived according to her theory, despite it actually
being more in line with Bergson’s critique of temps espace than it seems on first glance.5 Instead,
Langer contends that musical space is more of a perceived “secondary illusion” than something
determinate like note-values, a phenomenon only suggested by music as part of its virtual image:
…there are definitely spatial illusions created in music…but the space of music is never
made wholly perceptible as the fabric of virtual time is; it is really an attribute of musical
time, and appearance that serves to develop the temporal realm in more than one
dimension. Space, in music, is a secondary illusion. But, primary or secondary, it is
thoroughly ‘virtual,’ i.e. unrelated to the space of actual experience. (Langer 1953: 117)6
5

The spatialization of time as note-values, as Koechlin suggests, is precisely the kind of spatialization of time that
Bergson “talks about.” Rhythmic values, which quantify the passage of time, are an extension of clock-time itself,
determined by tempo, which is measured in a proportion of beats per minute.
6
For Langer, this more adequately accounts for the kinds of “spaces” achieved in music—the sense of harmonic
“distance,” of textural “depth,” and the like—that do not depend upon “quantification” in perception (conceptual
determinateness) in order to be “understood.” Despite the fact that measurable determinations are, in fact, calculated
in the process of composition and also discernable in the act of analysis. Furthermore, they are sedimented in
cognition through the development of musical literacy.
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For Langer, the “primary illusion” of any artistic medium is substantive, while the secondary
illusion “endows it with the richness, elasticity, and wide freedom of creation that make real art
so hard to hold in the meshes of theory” (Langer 1953: 118). Music is central to Langer’s
Bergsonianism because its “primary illusion” is that of durée; she goes so far to say that music,
as such, is a symbolization of duration.
The semblance of this vital, experiential time is the primary illusion of music. All music
creates an order of virtual time, in which its sonorous forms move in relation to each
other—always and only to each other, for nothing else exists there…music spreads out
time for our direct and complete apprehension, by letting our hearing monopolize it—
organize, fill, and shape it, all alone. It creates an image of time measured by the motion
of forms that seem to give it substance, yet a substance that consists entirely of sound, so
it is transitoriness itself. Music makes time audible, and its form and continuity sensible.
(Langer 1953: 109-110)
Whether or not we accept Langer’s theory, it is evident that Carter’s music is consciously
constructed to make time “audible” and its continuity “sensible.” Commentators have articulated
this in so many words: for example, Schiff sees Carter as “a shaper of time,” suggesting that the
way in which his music “articulates time…is its compositional essence” (Schiff 1983: 36).
Although Langer goes unmentioned in Schiff’s discussion, his comment is strikingly similar to a
statement in Feeling and Form:
What, then, is the essence of all music? The creation of virtual time, and its complete
determination by the movement of audible forms. (Langer 1953: 125)
Carter’s well known, if reluctantly penned Artistic Credo corroborates this view, remarking that
his music is concerned with changes and contrasts in temporal “flow” which reveal themselves
“in changes of harmony, of rhythm and texture,” concluding that it is “essentially a kinetic
projection of ideas using perspectives of time” (Meyer and Schreffler 2008: 79).
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The different conceptualizations of time in Carter’s essay (and the scholarship)—experiential
time, musical time, psychological time, clock time, and of course duration—make the most
sense with reference to Langer’s understanding of music as presenting a virtual image of
Bergson’s durée. My central point in my discussion thus far is to illustrate that Carter’s thinking
about musical time is apparently consistent with Langer’s. Carter understands musical time as
virtual time, which is overlaid on the durée of lived experience; as he as clearly remarks:
“‘musical’ or ‘virtual’ time is projected on a time screen of the listener’s ‘pure (or ‘subjective’)
duration’” (Carter 1997: 264).

However important for interpreting Carter’s prose, this does not mean that Langer’s work is most
useful for an adequate construal of time in Carter’s music. Adorno offers a critique of Bergson
that problematizes Langer’s theory, which relies on Bergson’s strict division between intuition
and reason, albeit with the “symbolic dimension” as caveat. As we will presently see, while
Langer is helpful in understanding the matter of time Carter’s prose, Adorno figures more
importantly for an proper understanding of the matter of time in Carter’s music.

Adorno’s Critique of Bergson
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno offers few but very clear critiques of Bergson’s philosophy.
In the concept of le temps durée, of lived duration, Bergson tried theoretically to
reconstruct the living experience of time, and thus its substantial element that had been
sacrificed to the abstractions of philosophy and of causal-mechanical natural science…
More positivistically than he knew in his polemicizing, he absolutized the dynamic
element out of disgust with the rising reification of consciousness; he on his part made of
it a form of consciousness, so to speak, a particular and privileged mode of cognition.
(Adorno 2007: 333-4)
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For Adorno, Bergson’s project, although correctly motivated by “an immediate-intuitive
awareness of the living [intuition] against conceptual-classificatory thought” (Adorno 2013: 45),
nonetheless re-incorporates philosophy back into reified life with his move to renounce the
conceptual. Bergson’s dualistic insistence on two separate forms of cognition—intuition and
reflective reason—is the same tacit bias that produces science’s apparent objectivism, which
Bergson rightly criticized. Positivism’s pursuit of objectivity and falsifiability led it to reject
subjective experience as incommensurable with truth. However, Bergson’s intuitionism
ultimately accepts the same bifurcation by privileging immediate experience given to intuition
instead. By exalting intuition at the expense of reason, Bergson’s metaphysics succumbs to the
same reification of thought that he rightly decries in the positivistic sciences.

For Adorno, this is a philosophical blunder, although he understands its “truth content.” Reading
Bergson “against the grain” reveals a larger point about the crisis of modern subjective
experience and the increasingly antagonistic nature of time in capitalist society.
But the crass dichotomy of Bergson's two times does register the historic dichotomy
between living experience and the objectified and repetitive labor process; his brittle
doctrine of time is an early precipitation of the objective social crisis in the sense of time.
The irreconcilability of temps durée and temps espace is the wound of that split
consciousness whose only unity lies in being split. The naturalistic interpretation of temps
espace can no more master this than the hypostasis of temps durée, in which the subject,
flinching from reification, hopes in vain to preserve itself simply by being alive. (Adorno
2007: 334)
Adorno’s comment here is pregnant with insight relevant to our discussion of modern
temporality in general and Carter’s rhythmic processes in particular. Bergson’s antagonism of
temps espace and temps durée is here understood as an expression of distress over the increasing
reification of social time in a capitalist economy, founded on the extraction of surplus value from
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labor remitted by an hourly wage. As I will discuss further below, competition requires capital to
progressively intensify this process, resulting in the increased intrusion of “clock time” in
spheres of everyday life that had, historically, otherwise been experienced more concretely and
qualitatively along the lines of a temps durée that Bergson describes. In this sense, the rhythm of
daily life, which is admittedly already antagonistically split from working life, becomes
dominated by abstraction time. For Adorno, Bergson’s philosophy as a whole represents an
unconscious realization of and resistance to this process, which was historically becoming more
and more acute. I will discuss the significant of this “temporal struggle” below with a
consideration of Jonathan Martineau’s (2016) work on capitalist temporality, particularly his
concepts of abstract time and concrete time, which helpfully parallel Bergson’s temps espace and
temps durée.

I understand Langer as sensitive to problem Adorno underscores in Bergson’s philosophy. Her
“symbolic dimension,” a mode of cognition engaged in immediate experience yet also reliant on
quasi-conceptual non-discursive forms, is an interesting attempt to bridge Bergson’s intuition
and positivism’s scientific reason. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, her project tacitly accepts
the same bifurcation, and therefore falters in its suggestion of the arts as inhabiting a virtual
realm, as if likewise positioned somewhere between actual experience and abstract thought.
Langer’s symbolic dimension can only permit music as an “image” of experiential time, instead
of recognizing that is a concretely temporal, social act. While her symbolic theory is admirable,
her philosophy ultimately suffers from a lack of dialectical mediation, the kind of which is
central to Adorno, to which we’ll presently turn.
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Adorno’s Dialectical View of Experience
Adorno’s answer to this apparently irreconcilable bifurcation lies in his particular distinction
between Erfahrung and Erlebnis. “Fully interpretative experience,” or Erfahrung, which is what
art ultimately requires of us, moves toward a “judgment…demands a decision…calls for
concepts” (Adorno 1998a: 244). It is reflexive and also critical. On the other hand, “lived
experience,” or Erlebnis (akin to Bergson’s duration), “is merely a moment within interpretive
experience, a faulty one” (ibid)—faulty because it has quality of unmediated truth, a “flash” of
“immediate reality” that can be misleading if not dialectically critiqued.7 Adorno argues that if
Erlebnis is privileged over Erfahrung, as in Bergson, it results in an intuitionism that is
subjective and ahistorical, unable to make claims on the objects of experience; it is ultimately
forced to content itself with quasi-quietist mysticism.

However, Adorno does not dispute the moment of truth in Erlebnis—he understands that it can
have a critical function in relation to Erfahrung. In lived experience, one can be “overwhelmed
in the moment of intuition and delivered out of subsumption” (Adorno 1998a: 244)—i.e.
Erlebnis momently circumvents conceptualization in its direct engagement with the
particularities of experience. In other words, it allows us to access the non-identical, the aspects
of experience that are not wholly “covered” by concepts. However—and this is a key
distinction—only through reflection can this aspect of experience be allowed to circle back on
reason and remind it of “what it forgot.” Erlebnis is productive when it negates our reified
concepts and forces thought to create webs of understanding, or “constellations” of concepts, that

7

Adorno likens this to the moment of being “convinced” by rhetoric or propaganda.
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are more appropriately mobile. For Adorno, this is a (negative) dialectical process of both
thought and experience, neither of which should dominate the other (Adorno 2013: 46).

The dialectical movement of Adorno’s Erfahrung must come full circle—concepts alone reduce
the particularities of actual experience (Bergson’s critique of positivism), but experience alone
can make no purchase on reality without the forms of understanding (Langer’s critique of
Bergson); for Adorno, only a dialectical motion wherein experience moves through thought as
much as thought moves through experience can bring us to both a deeper understanding of
reality and a more receptive sensitivity to the world. In Hegelian terms, Adorno insists that
experience must be as much of a determinate negation of thought as much as thought determines
the objects of experience. However, unlike in Hegel (and Bergson), neither side should be
assumed to be absolute.8

On “the listener’s time sense”—the Actuality of Musical Time
Adorno’s dialectical view of experience suggests that we cannot take a Bergsonian/Langerian
conception of time as the basis for an aesthetics of temporality in Carter’s music; it should
therefore also caution against Carter’s conception for the same reason. While much of Carter’s
music proceeds processually, if not dialectically, his claim in the quote that opens this chapter
suggests an undialectical view of experience that must be guarded against:
All the materials of music have to be considered in relation to their projection in time,
and by time, of course, I mean not visually measured ‘clock-time’ but the medium
through which (or way in which) we perceive, understand, and experience events. Music
deals with this experiential kind of time and its vocabulary must be organized by a

8

The relation of Subject and Object is described by Adorno as a relation between “the how” and “the what”—
objects of experience come prior to thought, which attempts to appropriately construe them. This is a dialectical,
continually mobile relationship. See Adorno’s “On Subject and Object” in Arato and Gebhardt 1998.
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musical syntax that takes direct account of, and thus can play on, the listener’s time
sense… (Edwards 1972: 90)
It is evident in this passage that Carter is suggesting that “experiential time” and “clock time” are
separate modes of cognition, the former being more appropriate for determining the rhythmic
organization of music over the latter. The assumed separation between the two is undoubtedly a
result of Bergson’s influence, clearly signaled in Carter’s comment that clock time is “visually
measured.” Carter’s Bergsonian duality leads him to imply that the listener has a “time sense”
separate from rationally conceived time, which is the very same hypostatization that we often see
in the music literature.9 As Adorno’s Negative Dialectics has shown, the separation between
intuition and reason, and therefore the separation between experiential time and clock time, is
only an apparent separation that has its actual basis in antagonistic society—it “is the wound of
that split consciousness whose only unity lies in being split” (Adorno 2007: 334). A work of art,
particularly music, apparently reinforces this “illusion” (to use Langer’s term), but it is only a
result of the work’s semblance character, which is founded on actual material processes.10
Despite the apparent “truth” of Erlebnis—the flash of immediacy one experiences in listening—
it is merely a moment within a more dialectical process of interpretive understanding as
Erfahrung, which is the mediation of intuition and reason, of experiential time and our more
rationalized conceptions of it. The “listener’s time sense” is therefore not separate from the
“listener’s time understanding,” for lack of a better locution, but only a moment within the
dialectical motion of the whole of experience, from Erlebnis through Erfahrung (and back).

9

For a classic example see Abbate 2004.
I will explain this further in Chapter Five.
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To understand how this works in art, it is worthwhile to consider an illustrative passage from
Aesthetic Theory. Adorno characterizes the apparently immediate, experiential moment in the
work of art as a “shock,” and yet is careful to clarify that this is not a wholly subjective moment:
The shock aroused by important works is not employed to trigger personal, otherwise
repressed emotions. Rather, this shock is the moment in which recipients forget
themselves and disappear into the work… (Adorno 1998a: 244)
This moment of absorption is a function of the whole, of both the materially formed work as
mediation and fully encompassing experience as Erfahrung:
This immediacy, in the fullest sense, of relation to artworks is a function of mediation, of
penetrating and encompassing experience [Erfahrung]; it takes shape in the fraction of an
instant, and for this the whole of consciousness is required, not isolated stimuli and
responses. (ibid)
Thus it is not merely subjective, but a moment in the dialectical relation of Subject and Object:
The experience of art as that of its truth or untruth is more than subjective experience: It
is the irruption of objectivity into subjective consciousness. The experience is mediated
through subjectivity precisely at the point where the subjective reaction is most intense.
(Adorno 1998a: 244-245, emphasis mine)
So, while the “listener’s time sense”—whether in music or otherwise—seems subjective, cut off
from a reflective, rational understanding of time, it is only apparently so. This is an important
point that should clear up some of the Langerian assumptions in Carter’s characterization of time
in music: I submit that music is not an “image of passage,” or a “symbol” of experiential time,
but is as actual as anything else experienced—as an object of lived experience music mediates
our experience of time as much as the objective processes of social life of which clock time is
included.11 Only this kind of conception can bridge the apparent divide between the experience

11

This is not to say that music does not have a special role in the mediation of experiential time. As Adorno argues,
through the laws of aesthetic form, musical time can be a site of resistance to empirical time, just as Bergson’s durée
was assumed to be a corrective to temps espace.
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and understanding of music, as much as it can bridge the divide between the work as a product of
human labor and the experience of said work, itself a product of human labor in performance. A
Langerian conception of music as a virtual image of lived experience forgets that music is not an
image, but part of lived experience. It is not illusory and subjective, but actual and social.

For this reason I claim that an aesthetic conception of Carter’s music must start with the matter
of time in its actuality. Before outlining a materialist conception of time in Carter’s music, it is
first necessary to discuss the matter of time in its social form.

Abstract Time and Concrete Times
It is appropriate to begin with a conception of time that is processual, especially given the nature
of Carter’s music. Anne Pomeroy offers a Whiteheadian description of time that is consistent
with Carter’s:
…temporality is an emergent feature [which only] comes into view on the level of
ontological atoms-in-relation. Thus, we might say: time is the manifestation of the
being of process…[or, alternatively] the activity of self-relation and creation is the
engine of processive being/becoming [that] constitutes time. (Pomeroy 2004: 111,
emphasis mine)
Essentially, for Pomeroy (and Whitehead) time is an emergent feature of life processes—the
being-as-becoming of the natural world with human beings(-as-becoming) included within.
While this characterization of time is suggestive, especially in relation to Carter’s music, because
of its metaphysical orientation it is not (yet) immediately useful for a materialist conception of
time. As Martineau has correctly noted:
This ‘process of becoming’ should not be seen as a metaphysical construction, somehow
transcending social life. Rather, it is constantly made and remade by social practices
considered as an empirical whole. This process of becoming is itself a concrete time
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made up of the totality of natural, social and human concrete cycles, processes, and
rhythms of interactions. (Martineau 2016: 164, emphasis mine)
For Martineau, while time is an emergent feature of life processes, it must be understood as a
feature of specific processes: those of human social relations. While correctly conceived as a
process of becoming, time, as it concerns humans, must also be understood as a concretely social
phenomenon. Martineau suggests three “moments” of social time relations: those of natural
cycles and processes, human bodily process, and particular societal relations. These moments are
constitutive of each other and are determined particularly by human relations of social
reproduction, which both variable and historically specific.12

Following this, Martineau’s second point is that capitalism, as a form of social (re)production,
creates an antagonistic rift in social time relations. Under the capitalist mode of production, all
temporal relations—whether bodily, natural, or otherwise—are determined by clock time, which
“occupies a hegemonic position in the hierarchy of temporalities” due to its centrality in the
moment of surplus value appropriation.
In pre-capitalist societies, the moment of appropriation is not simultaneous to production.
Although official [clock] time strives to dominate other times, appropriation in precapitalist contexts is effectuated in the form of an appropriation occurring after
production, or prior to it if considered from the point of view of surplus transfers legally
12

As Marx has shown, even “nature” itself, despite seeming estranged from man, is not separate but both part of his
own body and part of his own making: “The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in
the fact that man (like the animal) lives on inorganic nature; and the more universal man is compared with an
animal, the more universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, the air,
light, etc., constitute a part of human consciousness in the realm of theory, partly as objects of natural science, partly
as objects of art-his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must rest prepare to make it palatable
and digestible-so too in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human life and human activity. Physically man
lives only on these products of nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a dwelling, or
whatever it may be. The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all
nature his inorganic body-both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and
the instrument of his life-activity. Nature is man's inorganic body-nature, that is, in so far as it is not itself the human
body. Man lives on nature-means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous intercourse if he
is not die. That man's physical and spiritual life linked nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is
a part of nature” (Marx and Engels 1978: 75).
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or customarily determined before production. It relies on the alienation of the product of
labour, but not systematically of the ‘time of labour’. In capitalist social time relations,
however, appropriation is effectuated simultaneously to the process of labor itself, it
relies on the relationship between alienated labor and alienated time, on the fusion
between [concrete] human labor and abstract clock-time units. As such, capitalist clocktime becomes dominant, hegemonic, in capitalist social time relations in a systematic
way. (Martineau 2016: 164-165)
In other words, clock time, while itself a social artifact that preexisted capitalism, becomes
internal to the “moment of appropriation” in capitalist labor relations—clock time becomes the
objective measure of the value of all human labor, otherwise concrete and particular, which it
attempts to equalize into equivalences of fixed durational units. In this way, clock time becomes
an absolute abstraction that stands against concrete times, antagonistic to socio-temporal
relations that are multiple and otherwise determined by the unique social processes that produce
them. Building on the concept of alienation in Marx, Martineau argues that “capitalist time”—
clock time in its hegemonic position at the top of a capitalist temporal infrastructure—therefore
takes on a confrontational “external existence” in relation to them.13 In advanced capitalist
societies, this sort of temporal alienation becomes total; Martineau describes this phenomenon
with the Lukácsian concept of reification:14
What appears as the immediate reality of time in capitalism is thus in fact the expression
of a series of mediations in which time has become alienated and reified. (Martineau
2016: 19)

13

In Marx: “the alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, and external
existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its
own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile
and alien” (Marx 2007: 72).
14
“…alienation occurs when objectified forms are appropriated through historically constituted means of
appropriation that strip away and separate forms and products of human activity from their producers, and make
these forms and products appear as something independent, alien, something belonging to an outside force over
which agents have no control. Reification…is a specific form of alienation occurring in capitalist societies, where
commodified human activity becomes a thing that is bought and sold on the market, and commodified social
relations take on the form of relations between things” (Martineau 2016: 18).
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Reification literally means “thingified;” the reification of time, if time is understood as the
“manifestation of being as process,” is a contradiction: the very nature of time is the dynamic
process of becoming, reified time presents time as it is not: static being.

Along the lines of abstract and concrete labor, one can therefore situate abstract and concrete
time: abstract time, the reification of time into the equivalent, quantifiable units of clock time
necessary for the determination of value, stands in a hegemonic position over multiple concrete
times, which are otherwise determined by particular activities of particular people in particular
social situations.15 Just as both the product of labor and the activity of labor itself are alienated
and estranged under capitalist relations of production, time also becomes alienated and
estranged, thus reified. For Adorno, Bergson’s significance in the history of philosophy is his
unconscious articulation of this antagonism. As quoted above,
…[the] dichotomy of Bergson's two times does register the historic dichotomy between
living experience and the objectified and repetitive labor process; his brittle doctrine of
time is an early precipitation of the objective social crisis in the sense of time. (Adorno
2007: 334)
What Adorno characterizes as an “objective social crisis” is essentially the antagonism that
capitalist time presents. Modernity is characterized by this distinct temporal antagonism, the
tendency of capital to intensify the rationalization and efficiency of its temporal relations in
opposition to the irreducible substratum of concrete time(s) that make up the social fabric of
lived daily life as experienced by human beings. This becomes a site of struggle, between
abstract time and concrete times: the former, which increasingly determines possibilities of the

15

Incidentally, this accounts for the notion of “psychological time,” or the perception of how quickly time passes as
determined by an engaged subject undergoing a particular experience. This sense of time is concrete and variable,
although not subjective: Adorno will remind us that it always depends upon and is determined by the object, or “the
what,” of experience.
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latter, the latter, which resists the determinations of the former to the extent to which its concrete
particularities are incommensurable with it. Much like the contradiction within the concept
outlined in Chapter One, there is a non-identical moment of lived, concrete experience, wherein
concrete times, taken as the activities and experiences that produce them, can resist reified time.
For Adorno, this is articulated most clearly in art.

Excursus: Musical Time as a Resistance to Reified Time
The negative moment aroused by the non-identical, the irreducible aspect of experience that
resists conceptual subsumption, opens up to us most clearly in art. Adorno admits that we cannot
rationalize it, but we can trace its contours mimetically—our mimetic faculty, as he calls it,
allows us to open ourselves to the object, to the Other, circumventing the identity thinking that is
reinforced by our reified socio-economic world. This mimetic faculty is about movement,
gesture, action, and process—it is temporal, but concretely temporal. It is effectuated in lived
experience but also leaves its traces in concepts, through the negative function of Erlebnis, which
become sedimented in thought over time. Reification continually attempts to harden and fix
sedimentation in its insistence on conceptual identity, on the fungiblity of concepts, but
dialectical thought is vivified again through fully interpretive experience as Erfahrung, which
includes the moment of mimetic comport receptive to the non-identical. Art, in this sense, stands
in emphatic opposition to the reified world, although it dialectically includes it, just as the nonidentical stands in opposition to instrumental reason. Art is a determinate negation of the world
in the sense that it does not reproduce what it criticizes, but opens up alternative possibilities for
human becoming that can be sedimented back into critical conceptual thought, deepening our
awareness and possibilities for thought (and action) once more in the future. In this way, musical
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time can resist reified time, be a model for the reconciliation of alienated time, as much as the
experience of its organized sound can present an alternative to the world’s noise; to the degree to
which music can appropriate its historically mediated materials and mimetically transform them,
an interpretive experience of this music can likewise return and negate the reified
conceptualizations of being (as opposed to becoming) that the world reinforces.

Toward a Material Theory of Carter’s Rhythmic Practice
Following this, I would like to suggest that we build a material theory of temporality in Carter’s
music that understands a dialectic abstract and concrete time as its core. This should be pursued
both on the level of individual pieces and on the level of his practice as a whole. Within each of
his mature works Carter there is an antagonism between abstract temporal schema and concrete
musical processes. In the works of the 1950s this appears on a more concrete level, but through
the works of the 1960s and ‘70s the constructive temporal antagonisms gradually become more
generalized, resulting in the Long-Range Polyrhythm of the 1980s, a total reification of abstract
temporal relations that forms the metric scaffolding of entire works against which concrete
musical processes in the foreground resist.

At the end of his analysis of A Mirror on Which to Dwell, a pivotal work in which Carter starts
employing sections of structural polyrhythms, Klaus Columbier briefly identifies this tendency in
Carter’s musical development, which is worth quoting in full:
As with most of his compositional techniques, Elliott Carter developed an idea at
the surface level, to gradually abstract it until it becomes a structural feature at the
background level… This idea of combining different ‘characters’ in a rather
straightforward way in the Cello Sonata (1948) developed into a sophisticated
stratification of time in his compositions since 1980, giving each instrument or
group of instruments its own rhythmic vocabulary (and temporal grammar). Anti-
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metric figures can suggest an ephemeral beat in conflict with the reigning beat
(which the potential of becoming a new beat through metric modulation). In the
same way the individual strands of a polyrhythmic cycle suggest a division of time
that is often rather incongruent with the beat and tempo of the composition.
Eventually, combinations of different divisions of the beat in a local polyrhythm
can be seen as the roots of combining different divisions of the entire duration of a
piece, a structural polyrhythm. This large-scale polyrhythm is then applied first as a
surface phenomenon in early compositions such as the Double Concerto, but
through the connection with text, we can see that in A Mirror on Which to Dwell the
positioning of the polyrhythmic structure in the form of the composition is chosen
more accurately. This led to the method of the 1980s, where structural polyrhythms
are almost exclusively structural devices and are (quasi) invisible at the musical
surface. (Coulembier 2012: 25)
While this is the extent of Coulembier’s comments on the matter, I believe it is crucial to develop
this idea through a thorough analytical interpretation of Carter’s music as a whole. I would like
to add that study of the progressive tendency toward temporal abstraction in Carter’s works
should be equally concerned with pursuing the ways in which concrete musical behaviors
contradict this tendency. Unlike some of Carter’s contemporaries, this tendency toward
progressive abstraction is not the same as a tendency toward the total systemization of temporal
relations that attempts to integrate rhythm and other musical domains, like that of pitch. It must
be emphasized that the structural polyrhythm developed out of an interest to formalize
oppositional pulse speeds, borne out of concrete oppositions of musical character. As Columbier
noted, this impulse is rooted in the Sonata for Cello and Piano, which very deliberately attempted
to address the antagonism of abstract, clock time (in the piano) and a more concrete, antiobjective expressive time, both of which are presented on a concrete surface level. This required
developing musical patterns of behavior that divided a central pulse in distinct, separate ways, an
idea that was further developed beyond the Sonata in the String Quartet No. 1, which presented
four distinct metric characters. This fundamental rhythmic discontinuity on a concrete level
required developing a method of metric continuity in order to integrate separate pulse speeds
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projected by opposing musical characters pursued on the surface level on a higher, (abstract)
formal level: metric modulation, which was first instituted in moments of the Cello Sonata, but
becomes a central dramatic device used throughout in the First String Quartet. Metric
modulation, originally developed to achieve a continuity between conflicting metrical pulses on
a concrete level, becomes itself an abstract procedure used in subsequent works to emphasize the
discontinuity and temporal incommensurability of disparate musical themes: in the Variations for
Orchestra, it becomes a central mechanism for achieving temporal discontinuity with reference
to a governing pulse. The Second String Quartet takes the notion of temporal discontinuity of
concrete metrical characters to an extreme; the formal design of the work is as much an
expression of temporal rupture as it is an attempt to integrate the various conflicting metrical
behaviors on the musical surface. This general arch, from the Cello Sonata to the Second String
Quartet, is traced on a higher level with from the Double Concerto through the String Quartet
No. 3—the dialectic of abstract temporal formalizations and now pitch schematizations versus
concrete metrical and gestural ideas which resist their integration into the governing
abstractions.16

It is clear that the 1970s is a moment of transition with regard to Carter’s temporal practice.
Columbier has already shown this with the development of the LRP in A Mirror on Which to
Dwell, but I suggest that temporal alienation becomes a central feature in the Third String
Quartet, which is still schematized according to the kinds of divisions Carter employed in the
works of the 1960s, and especially in the Duo for Violin and Piano, a work which conceives of

16

This is a dialectic of particular and general in these works which could also be read along the lines of a dialectic of
individual and social, an expression of the antagonism that Adorno outlines in his critique of the “administered
society”—that the postwar interventionist Keynesian state formed an antagonistic opposition to the actualization of
the bourgeois Subject.
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the two instrumental parts as incommensurable characters like the Sonata for Cello and Piano. A
comparative analysis of the Cello Sonata and Duo along the lines of the dialectic of concrete and
abstract time would be able to demonstrate how the same central antagonism is expressed
differently at these two turning points in Carter’s practice. Furthermore, from a socio-historical
perspective, such a study could suggest the extent to which both pieces telegraph their respective
historical crises: the Cello Sonata and the onset of the Cold War, Duo and the severe economic
crises that begin to emerge in the 1970s. Judith Stein has argued that the energy crises and
subsequent rounds of inflation in 1970s were engendered by the antagonistic contradiction
between American domestic policy and its Cold War foreign agenda. That these issues are
dialectical antagonisms on an historical level suggests that they may be implicated on the level of
Carter’s music, which was uniquely responsive to the changing dynamics of its social situation.
This is something a materialist aesthetics of Carter should consider.

The fact that the structural polyrhythms become a universal temporal schemes governing
Carter’s works from the 1980s forward demands that a theory of temporality in Carter should
focus on the ways in which concrete musical gestures contradict them, and furthermore ways in
which certain works actually break with their scheme for expressive purposes. This follows the
notion discussed above that the concrete times of lived experience are meaningful to the extent
that they resist reified time, demanding a more autonomous, human way of being (as becoming)
in the world. I suggest that the development of a structural polyrhythm in Carter is a form of
temporal reification not unlike capitalist time, which stands in a hegemonic position to concrete
times in a capitalist infrastructure. Following Adorno’s theory of art as a determinate negation of
the world briefly sketched above, a thorough consideration of this issue in Carter should attend to

66

the possibilities of alternative ways of experiencing musical time posed by local, “anti-metric”
behaviors and gestures on the concrete musical surface are irreducible to the reified temporal
structures that govern the shape of a piece on an abstract level. This kind of non-identity between
gesture and scheme is central to Carter’s music in this period.

Finally, the triadic idea of temporal alienation-temporal reification-breakthrough should be
of central concern for the evaluation of Carter’s “late style.” While scholars have already
recognized Carter’s distillation of harmonic procedures in his works of the 1990s, the question of
whether or not the notion of temporal reification persists in such a determinative way would be
an important signal for the onset of a “late style,” which Adorno contends is a moment of
dissolution of established compositional procedures and norms. I would like to suggest that a
true “late style” in Carter begins to emerge later than what has already been suggested in the
scholarship. If Carter’s consolidated practice in the 1990s would be considered as a Seconda
Prattica, an Adornian late style would emerge in moments where this practice is fractured. I
understand this beginning to happen in Carter’s last works, marked by his turn to poetry and
increasing austerity of musical texture and gesture.

While my suggestions hear read as schematic and speculative as Coulembier’s, I hope to at least
frame the matter of time in Carter’s music for productive further study. In sum, I understand
Carter’s temporal practice as simultaneously taking up the issue of temporal reification and
resisting it in various ways that is expressed both internally to individual works and historically,
over the course of his work, as a dialectic of abstract and concrete time. Both individually and
historically, I suggest that Carter’s music moves through phases of temporal alienation,
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reification, and breakthrough, which continually engender new issues for the possibility of his
music, both formally and aesthetically, to move forward. A material theory of Carter’s rhythmic
practice must explicate this on the concrete level of his music, but should also concern itself with
the notion that the dynamics of American society, its historical trajectory over the course of
Carter’s creative life, is also implicated in this dialectic. I have tangentially mentioned ideas
toward this end; I will suggest more in my final chapter and will pursue this more directly in
subsequent work.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The First Page of Gra: An Adornian Analysis

Example 4.1: Carter – Gra (1993), measures 1-13.
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The Problem of Pitch Analysis in Carter (or Otherwise)
Adorno’s negative dialectics reminds us that contradiction is at the heart of understanding. It is in
the nature of the concept to reduce the particularities of phenomena in order to wrangle out
identity between the object and our schematized representation—in other words, to seek a
harmony between our structures of understanding and the diversity of experience. Adorno’s
critique of Hegel indicted him on this charge: Hegel’s dialectical thought, as powerful as it was,
sublated all contradictions into an ultimate identity. This created the illusion that mind could
fully encompass the world. For Adorno, it could not; Adorno felt there were irreducible aspects
of actual experience, of phenomena, which could not bow to the domination of conceptual
thought.

Works of music are irreducibly particular despite being constructed out of musical abstractions
(especially in Carter’s case). For this reason Adorno felt that music was superior to philosophy.
Music could achieve that which philosophy could only speculate toward: it is capable of holding
the particular and the general, the concrete and the abstract, in a unique dialectical tension
wherein the latter does not dominate the former.

This raises an important issue for the analysis of music. Analysis is the attempt to reduce the
irreducible, to parse and generalize music into conceptual abstractions. Unavoidably, analysis departicularizes music—quite literally un-musics it. Given this, the question becomes: how does
one analyze a work of music so that the significance of the irreducible particular is made
explicit? Put another way, how does analysis, an inherently reductive procedure by definition,
keep itself from abstracting music into the forms of conceptual identity that, for Adorno, remove
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its very essence? It seems like an impossible task, an irresolvable contradiction.1

Nevertheless, Adorno suggests a way forward. His negative dialectics was devised to seek out
the particular, the moment of non-identity between concept and referent, so that the irreducible
aspects of experience could challenge concepts, go through them in order to resist their
dominating force—as understood in the dialectical motion of Erlebnis and Erfahrung—in order
to preserve the “non-identity of identity.” When it comes to music, this means neither contenting
ourselves with an analytical reduction nor a phenomenological description alone, but forcing the
latter to go through the former in order to reveal the moment of contradiction between the two.

In my discussion below, I will attempt an analysis of the first page of Carter’s Gra that follows
the thrust of Adorno’s negative dialectics. I choose this work two reasons. The main reason is
that Gra, like many of Carter’s later pieces, is consciously concerned with revealing, or turning
toward, the non-identical. A successful Adornian analysis of this work will both provide an
example of Adorno’s dialectical thought and help to reframe our analytical focus for Carter’s
Seconda Prattica.2

Secondly, Margurite Boland (1999) has already offered an analysis of the work that serves as a
useful point of departure and basis for critique. While identifying the salient concrete aspects of
this piece—the contrast of character types and their role in determining form—Boland primarily
pursues the piece’s abstractions in its emphasis on set class structure. Granted, set class analysis

1

Scholars in music have already noted this. The classic example of this contradiction in recent musicology is framed
as the “gnostic” versus the “drastic.” See Abbate 2004.
2
I prefer this term for the practice Carter established in the 1990s over Link’s (2008) “late style” in order to
distinguish it from Carter’s last pieces, which I understand as embodying a “late style” in the Adornian sense.
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is indispensible to understanding Carter’s work in general, and this work in particular. Carter
consciously thought about pitch organization in his music along these lines, and it would be a
mistake not to examine the work from this perspective, as I will address below. However, as is
often the case in the analysis of Carter music, and music of similar complexity, a conventional
set class approach—set class reduction and subsequent examination of abstracted set class
relations—moves the analysis into higher levels of generalization, away from the concrete
particulars of the music, which are often reduced to a secondary level of consideration. While the
abstract set class relationships revealed in such analyses are often interesting, the extent to which
they are byproducts of a certain consistency of musical development on the surface level is an
additional task often not considered.

It can be argued that Carter’s approach to composition lends justification to emphasizing set
class structures in analysis regardless. It is well documented that Carter sketched abstract
harmonic relationships first before particularizing the musical surface—shouldn’t analysis be
concerned with reverse-engineering Carter’s work? Yes and no. Yes, we should be concerned
with articulating Carter’s background pitch structures because the music is consciously
composed in such a manner. Also, no, we should not be (overly) concerned with the background
set class relations because they are abstractions from the particularities of the work as heard in
time, which present their own “logic” of organization. Clearly there is a methodological
contradiction here. Essentially, the question is whether it makes more sense for an analysis to
move in the direction of concrete to abstract or abstract to concrete. I would answer: both. As I
will argue, while set class structure is important, it is only half of the “game”: we must also turn
toward the non-identical, seek the moments in Gra that resist the impulse to abstraction so that
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they may inform our interpretation of the music. I argue that this work is most productively
heard/understood in this manner because it consciously takes up this very issue in very concrete
and specific ways: this piece both invites that we understand what’s going on conceptually by
means of its readily identifiable set class structures, and its particular musical gestures also
contradict it, suggest that we hear other relationships inconsistent with the set classes structures
we analyze. In this sense, it is a (negative) dialectical kind of music: it both raises pitch class
structures and negates them. Our analysis should therefore trace these contradictions.

Analyzing the First Page of Gra
Example 4.2: Carter – Gra, measures 1-4.

The First Four Measures From a Set Class Perspective
In the opening measures of the piece the concept of the All-Interval Tetrachord is crucial. Boland
correctly describes its employment.
Bars 1-4 consist of repetitions of a single all-interval tetrachord T4 [0,1,4,6]. In the first
three repetitions the notes are grouped into diads [sic], distinguished by the rhythms and
articulation of the different character-types. Each of the six diads [sic] produces a
different interval, all six interval classes are therefore represented once in the first few
bars. At the end of bar 4 a quintuplet figure followed by three staccato notes makes up
another two repetitions of T4 [0,1,4,6], ordered such that again all six intervals are heard
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once, this time in quicker succession. (Boland 1999: 93)
I emphasize the word “repetition” to illustrate the unavoidable conclusion that conventional set
class analysis suggests, and how it can sneakily seduce even sophisticated scholars like Boland
away from the significance of the passage if not resisted. From a set class perspective, the first
four measures consist of five statements of (0146)4—therefore, following set theory “logic,” this
set class is repeated.3 However, “repetition,” at least the way it is here implied, is far from the
impression the music gives us on a rhetorical level, as I will discuss further below. Boland of
course recognizes this, hence her characterization of “how” this set class is, nonetheless,
repeated—the alternating dyadic partitions, each unfolding a different interval class, followed by
their quick summation again at the end of measure 4. It is important to note that she draws the
very conclusion that this method of analysis almost demands:
The first few bars then, have explored the maximal diversity of interval content in a
single all-interval tetrachord transposition, indicating both the interval variety to be
explored in the piece and establishing this as a technique for varying material. (Boland
1999: 94)
From a set class perspective, this is uncontroversial. Carter here presents an AIT, which contains
one of each interval class by definition, and they’re all presented one by one. Hence Boland’s
idea of “maximal diversity,” which she calls a “structuring principle”: “all possibilities of a
pitch/interval feature contained within given constraints are explicitly composed out and provide
the structuring logic of the passage” (Boland 1999: 97).

Despite the value of Boland’s analytical work, I wish to resist this interpretation. While the idea
3

I normally eschew the cumbersome T and TI notations and instead indicate the transposition level of particular
pitch class sets with a superscript. Therefore, (0146)4 indicates normal form transposed by 4 semitones: E-F-Ab-Bb.
A negative superscript indicates an inversion: (0146)-4 indicates inverted normal form transposed by 4 semitones: ED#-B#-A#.
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of “maximal diversity” is attractive as a “structuring principle” at first glance, it is rather an
aesthetic orientation that Carter shares with many other composers of his ilk—Babbitt, Boulez,
etc.—all of whom seek to exploit the full potential of their material within very specific
constraints, albeit with very aims, methods, and results. This supposed “principle” actually tells
us little about the significance of the possibilities “composed out” in this particular passage,
which are more than what a set class analysis leaves us to assume. While it is correct in its
assessment of the potentiality of the material Carter has chosen, we learn very little about the
actuality of this passage beyond what set theory can tell us, which is the greater point I’m trying
to underscore: an uncritical set class analysis can easily lead us to interpretations that merely
reinforce only what a set class analysis reveals. I do not wish to fault Boland—her work is very
thorough, and the necessary first step for a more nuanced interpretation. However, we cannot
reach said interpretation unless the particularities of the music are allowed to determine it; we
might miss salient musical determinants not revealed by a set class abstraction, particularly ones
that may be relevant to understanding the significance of certain set class relationships not
apparent on a purely abstract level.

Contradictions of the (Set Class) Concept
In my first chapter I used this passage to illustrate the non-identical between concept and
referent. I made observations about the passage that a conventional set class reduction might
ignore: the opposing character types, the fact of fixed register and the expressive limitations it
imposes on a “chord” of four notes, etc. For the purposes of that discussion, I wished to illustrate
that the constructive tension between the particular AIT used (one of two possibilities—why not
the other?) as an abstract form and its articulation, which hinges on the “dialogue” of the two

75

musical characters introduced—the first legato, using triplet beat divisions, the second staccatomarcato, using sixteenth beat divisions. I still hear conflict in the opposition of such limited
elements, especially the tension of fixed register, which severely circumscribes the possibilities
for dyadic partitioning on the surface, forcing the music to “break out” of the tetrachord in
measure five. However, my interpretation still assumes the AIT as a governing concept, placing
it in the foreground, whereas the music—as it is experienced—suggests otherwise.

The most significant thing about the opening measures of Gra is what is quickly taken for
granted: this is a monophonic work for unaccompanied clarinet. Barring the repeated
multiphonic on the last page, there is not a single simultaneity in the work, no chord to speak of.
To make a more Adornian point: that we are compelled to immediately think in terms of a
tetrachord in the first four measures, and then widen our conceptual scope to “chords” of six
notes thereafter (as Boland correctly shows), when we are attempting to understand a thoroughly
melodic piece should be evidence enough of the fact that reductive concepts dominate our
analytical thinking. I make this point not to disavow my earlier statement that the AIT is crucial
for understanding this work—it is—but to remind us of the core contradiction we face in the
analysis of this work: the first four measures are both more and less than their “governing”
concept.

On the one hand, the first four measures are less than the concept of the AIT simply because we
never hear one as such. There is never the impossible statement of the “chord” as such, as a
simultaneity. Nonetheless, the AIT’s prominence in Carter’s language is so ingrained in the
scholarship that analysts (and perhaps even informed listeners) take it as a “harmony” first, its
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component parts second, and a “melody” as a very distant third. Despite Boland’s insightful
observation that the All-Trichord Hexachord (ATH), of which the AIT is a subset, performs the
role of “source set” in this piece (beginning in measure five), the status of both ATH and AIT as
“harmonies” or “chords” that are “unfolded” over the course of the work is a clear tacit bias.

On the other hand, the first four measures are also more than the concept of the AIT simply
because the concept, in its poverty as an abstract set of note relationships, can never completely
“cover” the particularities of the phenomenon. I have already mentioned examples of this, but I
would like to pursue this idea further.

If an analyst can resist the urge to subsume the music under its reductive concept—which is
challenging because Carter’s music suggests this by design—we may hear important
relationships that are both structurally (and actually) more relevant. Boland has noted the
interaction of character types, which is crucial in revealing my point:
The nature of the interaction [in Gra] can be defined as juxtaposition, resulting in a
discontinuous flow of gestures. The interaction of character-types is, however, more
complex than the mere juxtaposition of contrasting materials. Over the span of the first
nine bars the legato material creates a stronger sense of continuity and connection
between its phrases than the other character-types…. The ends of the phrases are cut off
by the interruption of rests and of other character-types. However, the continual return
to the legato phrases sets up the expectation that these gestures are leading somewhere or
that they are seeking resolution. This resolution arrives with the last 6-note legato phrase
which initially crescendos but is not cut off this time; rather it is allowed to decrescendo,
creating a sense of closure. (Boland 1999: 92-93, emphasis mine)
This is an excellent beginning of an interpretation that is informed by the particularities of the
music, of the rhetoric of this piece, which she correctly understands as the “interaction of
character-types” and uses certain key words (in bold) that point toward the effect of their

77

behavior(s). Unfortunately, Boland does not follow these insights through in her analysis,
beyond noting that the overall structure of the work consists of sections dominated by one
character type or another.4 I would like to take seriously Boland’s suggestion that the interaction
between the three musical characters introduced in Gra is indeed “more complex than the mere
juxtaposition of contrasting materials.” For example, what particularly gives the sense of an
interruption, expectation, and discontinuity in the opening measures? Also, the sense of
resolution and closure in measure seven—how is that achieved? While rhythm, dynamics, and
articulation guide the perception of the continuity and discontinuity in this passage, I will attempt
to show how pitch relationships irreducible to set class membership determine them. This will
also tease out the Adornian contradictions that confront the analyst-listener in the interpretation
of this piece.

The First Four Measures From an Adornian Perspective
In the opening measures of the piece the linear motion of F to E is crucial. This semitone first is
heard as the source of the discontinuity between the legato and the staccato characters: the legato
rises from F to Ab, only to be interrupted by the staccato gesture, that pulls the melody abruptly
downward with the emphatic E (that leaps away up to Bb). The effect is of a sudden shift, a
contradiction—not only of character, but also of which note should be heard as “grounding” the
bottom register—the lowest note of the clarinet, or a semitone above? This is reinforced in
measure two: the legato voice descends from Bb to F, which is immediately yanked down to E
4

While her analysis is specific when concerned with abstract set classes, the various “interactions” of the musical
characters on a concrete level are quickly dismissed with generalities. Her conclusion to the above quote follows:
“Thus, a single character-type is shaping the continuity of the passage while at the same time the flow is being
interrupted by the interjection of contrasting character-types. This kind of interaction between different materials is
essential to the whole of the piece” (Boland 1999: 93).
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by the staccato voice once more. From a listener’s perspective, the linear, semitone motion of F
to E directs our hearing of the passage more than the fact that in the interim we are also hearing
each interval class contained in the ATH being introduced one by one. However, the deliberate
unfolding of all possible dyadic partitions of this set class is nonetheless also apparent, if not
obvious.
Example 4.3: Carter – Gra, measures 1-4.

I submit that right from these opening gestures, there is a contradiction between these particular
linear connections and the AIT as a governing set class. As I mentioned in the first chapter, the
fixed registral constraint emphasizes the contradiction: do we hear this as an “unfolding” of a
single (0146) in “normal form” or as the linear motion of half steps and, as we will presently see,
whole steps? I believe that this contradiction is what animates this passage, and speaks to the
truth of Adorno’s negative dialectics: this music is holding the both the concrete linear step
relations and the abstract set class structure in a unique dialectical tension wherein the latter does
not dominate the former—it is instead confronted by it. The particular registral connections we
hear, their expression of discontinuity (and continuity, as I will soon show) as articulated by the
opposed character types, resists the urge to hear this passage as a simple “repetition” of the same
set class form, just partitioned differently.
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If the F-E half step emphasizes discontinuity in the passage, the whole step from Ab to Bb can be
heard as establishing continuity. If we hear the initial legato gesture as being interrupted by the
staccato, its continuation to Bb in measure two can be heard as its continuation, even goal.
Granted, Bb was already heard a moment before, punctuated in the staccato voice, but it sounds
claimed by the legato in measure two as if it’s only now in its proper place. This idea of different
voices “claiming” certain pitches previously heard in an opposing voice is something else a
reductive set class analysis must ignore, but hear as very much part of the “game” in this piece. It
happens again in measure three: now the staccato voice claims F from the legato. This makes a
certain sense—twice already the staccato voice has contradicted the legato’s F with its own E,
drawing out the important relationship of this linear progression. Now, the staccato voice has
taken it over, which incidentally frees the legato voice to melodically connect Ab and Bb for the
first time uninterrupted. Boland is correct—continuity is gradually established over the course of
the first seven measures because the legato voice is given more to play, but what it is playing
matters as much—as we will see, the rising whole tone is the melodic element most employed by
the legato voice to create a sense of continuity, although it appears in other characters (even
across characters) for the same effect, as I will presently demonstrate.

The introduction of the new character—the quintuplet character—at the end of measure four
“summarizes” these step relations in quick succession: E-F and Ab-Bb. Their ordering the same
as just previously heard, but now disjointed. We hear the whole step two ways: as a quick
melodic “cadential” figure, Ab-Bb-Ab, and as two whole steps, the second Ab-(Bb) interrupted
by the rest and continued, or “taken” by the staccato voice immediately following. The staccato
voice does something interesting here: it connects its taken Bb with a whole step progression up
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to the first new note we hear in measure 5, the single staccato C. Granted, an emphatic repetition
of the F-E semitone intervenes, but the “fresh” note rings out as a linear step further beyond Bb.
This presents a challenge to set class analysis—at this point, a dogmatic parsing would require
trichord partitions: the C “belongs” to the (013) trichord in measure 5, while the previous three
notes are their own trichord unit, (016). I will talk more about this below, because it takes us into
the territory of the ATH, but suffice to say that the contradiction between the two readings—
linear and set class—is apparent.

This may appear as a very deep reading into a very short passage, but I think it is an important
rejoinder to an uncritical set class analysis that would see this passage merely as the gradual
unfolding of each of the interval classes of an AIT. A set class analysis recognizes the
partitioning, but it cannot explain why, for example, Carter saved the ic1-ic2 partition of the AIT
for last, which is sensibly answered from a liner step perspective: Carter saved the ic1-ic2
partition for last because this passage is “about” implied step relations, first heard disrupted
across voices—and partitions—finally coming to the foreground in measure 3. In actuality, while
it appears as an academic exercise of revealing the “maximal diversity” of a source set, the music
idea is much more simple (and profound); it is as much an opposition of character types as it is
of two types of step progressions: the minor second, which implies discontinuity, and the major
second, which implies continuity. Again, this is not to say that the set class perspective is
wrong—it’s actually necessary to understand the subtle conflict in the passage, which is only
revealed with attention to the possibility that the music itself—how it is heard—can resist the set
class reading, contradict it on a concrete level. I claim that this is the dialectical thrust of this
work; again, the conflict between the set class as a reductive concept and the irreducible
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particularities of the music that subvert it.

Conflicting Segmentations in Measures 5-9
There is another important question that a set class analysis cannot answer, but is answerable
from the perspective of linear step progressions: why didn’t Carter choose the other AIT—
(0137)—for this passage? He easily could have: it shares the same properties as (0146), by
definition, and it is also a subset of the ATH, which Boland has clearly shown “governs” the
remainder of the piece. The answer lends set theoretical credibility to my idea about the
importance of step progressions. Carter chose (0146) because its ATH remainder—the two of the
six notes left to complete the hexachord—is a semitone. Had he started with (0137) he could
have exhausted its “maximal diversity” in a similar way, the ATH remainder would be ic4,
which not let him proceed linearly in the same way. Instead, Carter chose (0146) because it
allowed him to pursue the semitone step relation in his unfolding of the first ATH of the piece.
Example 4.4: Carter – Gra, measures 3-9.
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As we see in measure five, the legato voice returns, “claims” the C just introduced by the
staccato voice—having completed the whole step progression from its Bb, as mentioned above—
which ultimately drops a semitone on the downbeat of measure 6. This emphatic gesture—the
first legato “phraselet” to crescendo to forte—completes ATH -0, but it is not heard as such. This
is a significant idea that has not gone unnoticed. David Schiff does not offer an analysis, but he
has observed:
An important part of Carter’s game is to find ways of restating the six-note figure without
having it sound like a six-note figure. (Schiff 1998: 147)
I would like to emphasize the distinction even further by stating that the hexachord rarely
appears as a musical “figure,” but only as an abstract concept that is often contradicted by the
actual figuration of the music itself. It is not merely that Carter is finding ways of hiding the
ATH, it’s more that his linear step progressions guide the listener into hearing other relationships
that contradict the ATH. Its first appearance provides an excellent example: the listener is given
no indication that the staccato-legato encounter at the end of measure 4 through measure 5
“should” be heard as a hexachord. As presented to the listener, four notes sound in the staccato
voice—Bb-E-F-C—followed by a four-note legato phrase—C-Ab-C-B. Taken with the
following staccato Bb, couldn’t we hear this as two tetrachords?

Were we to “look” for a hexachord here, we might not recognize a special coherence between
the four-note staccato idea in measures 4-5—Bb-E-F-C—and the AIT unfolded in the opening
measures: both four-note groupings consist of one semitone and one whole tone. A set class
analysis does not capture this similarity: (0157) is apparently incongruent with (0146).5 But we
5

Furthermore, a set class analysis would not recognize the Bb-E-F-C as significant because it doesn’t “fit”—it does
not fit the trichord partitioning of the ATH that we “want” to see, as measures 6-9 suggest.
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do hear the C in measure 5 as a step continuation of the Bb in the previous measure, and it is
likewise interrupted internally (as in, in the same voice) by the semitone E-F. Similar to the
opening gesture, we have a rising whole step interrupted by a lower register semitone linear
progression. This is a concrete, heard coherence that set class analysis cannot recognize.

The staccato C in measure 5 is then “claimed” by the legato voice, which ultimately “collapses”
the Bb-C whole step with a semitone step to B, filling in the space between. Thus the continuity
of the whole step in the staccato voice is contradicted by the half step in the legato voice, perhaps
suggesting that the characters are switching the roles laid out for them in the opening measures.

This dramatic moment is heard as another local discontinuity, but it also recalls the opening
gesture. Taken as a whole, we hear another major/minor third figure, an exact inversion of the
opening figure from the perspective of pitch content: E-F-Ab compared with Ab-B-C. In the
interest of very dutifully parsing the opening AIT into dyads, a dogmatic set class analysis would
miss the significance of this (013) trichord. I submit that it both recalls and is a continuation of
the opening gesture because it is heard as the same musical idea: a major/minor third figure with
the descending semitone emphasized, used as a gestural “cut,” in the cinematic sense of the
word.

The whole tone step connection is pursued in both measures 6 and 7. The staccato descends a
semitone further, and now reinstates the Bb-C whole step, if with hesitancy, almost “canceling”
that dramatic B in the legato voice. I hear a parallel between this and the previous staccato
“tetrachord” [the (0157) in measures 4-5], which sets up an expectation here—we hear the same
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Bb-C step uninterrupted this time (except by rests), and we likewise expect the E to move
directly to F, as before. The F does follow E at the end of measure 6, but in the wrong voice, thus
sounding “taken” by the legato. The legato voice leaps up to B, heard again as canceling the BbC whole step. The game is apparently becoming as much about which is the better interval—the
whole step or the half.

If we trace the trajectory of these steps over the opening measures, we notice some interesting
reversals. The E-F semitone is first heard as a discontinuity in measures 1-2, the staccato voice
twice pulling the bottom F of the legato voice down a semitone to E; the staccato voice
ultimately takes both notes of the semitone over, first quietly in measure 3, then emphatically at
the end of measure 4. We expect to hear the semitone again in the staccato voice in measure 6,
but the legato finally takes the F back. The whole tone motion of Ab-Bb in the legato voice, on
the other hand, is twice interrupted in the first two measures, and finally connected in measures
3-4. The staccato voice attempts to continue a whole step progression from Bb to C—disjointed
(at first) and twice contradicted by a B in the legato voice. The continuity of a whole step is
therefore implied, but it is the “wrong” whole step, at least evidenced by the fact that the “right”
whole step finally returns in the legato voice at the end of measure 6. It is spelled differently, but
is certainly heard as the same whole step the legato voice has been trying to unfold, against many
interruptions, since the opening gesture.

Boland’s comments about this moment in the music are general:
…the continual return to the legato phrases sets up the expectation that these gestures are
leading somewhere or that they are seeking resolution. This resolution arrives with the
last 6-note legato phrase which initially crescendos but is not cut off this time; rather it is
allowed to decrescendo, creating a sense of closure. (Boland 1999: 93)

85

I believe she is hearing the music correctly, but she does not explain why the music is heard this
way, beyond the dynamic indications that are helping us hear carefully crafted melodic step
relations. I hear a sense of “resolution” and “closure” in this phrase as a result the legato voice
attempting to “correct” a few things the staccato voice had previously tried to do:

1. The legato voice contradicts the staccato’s “wrong” whole step (Bb-C) with B.
2. The legato voice reinstates the “right” whole step (Ab-Bb, spelled G#-A#).
3. The legato voice then “corrects” the staccato’s “wrong” (0157) from measures 4-5,
containing the “wrong” whole step, with the “right” (0157)—G#-A#-D#-E—containing
the “right” whole step.

Significantly, this motion articulates a new note, D#, which has not yet been heard. This “fresh”
note is followed by a new interval: a descending major seventh. For the first time we hear a
semitone “opened” (inverted) to a major seventh for the very first time. We hear this new note
and major seventh descent both as the “cadence” of the phrase and also as a possible new
precedent to be followed.

4. Most importantly, this descent of a seventh brings the phrase to rest on E, a semitone
below the first note of the phrase: F.

As a whole, the legato voice takes over the familiar E-F semitone descent, now composed out to
bookend the phrase, which reinstates the Ab-Bb as its centerpiece. In a sense, this phrase is both
a summation and reconceptualization of the step progressions implied throughout the opening
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measures. It is therefore rightly heard as (momentarily) having both the resolution and closure
that Boland suggests.

My last observation about this section concerns the crucial impetus for continuation, which is
effectuated after this phrase: the first instance of registral displacement.

If we look at the staccato figure in the beginning of measure 9, we notice a few remarkable
things. First, it has abandoned the Bb-C whole step it had been harping on, instead starts of with
a quiet B, as if to cede the legato character’s point that Bb-C whole step was the wrong one. I
believe this explains Carter’s choice for AIT3 as the first transposition: while it contains the
crucial E-F semitone, it omits the “wrong” whole tone (Bb-C), yet keeps the B in its place.6 It
also introduces a new note following the same precedent set at the end of the preceding legato
phrase: new note followed by new interval. Whereas the legato character sounded an inverted
semitone from D#, the staccato character sounds an inverted whole tone from G. Again, we hear
ic1 and ic2, now inverted, separated only by one note, the same “resolution” note from the
downbeat of measure 6. It also occupies the same place of metrical prominence.

The new G leaps up a minor seventh to a very prominent F, accented. This is the first
displacement of a note from its fixed registral position. How is this justified? Perhaps by the
mere necessity to break the spatial pitch structure before it becomes rigidified, but I think it is
also by the D# in the previous measure. This interval of a diminished third is undoubtedly heard
6

Boland suggests a pattern of invariant tritones as an explanation for the various transposition/inversion levels of the
AIT on the first page of this work. While these relationships are demonstrable on an abstract level, I am not
convinced of their significance as an organizing idea. I prefer to understand the transposition/inversion levels (and
the invariances among them) as a byproduct of more local considerations, like gesture, register, and step relation.
For Boland’s argument see Boland 1999: 93-97.
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as a whole step, the interval of continuity, which serves to justify the F’s new registral position.
This is “confirmed” within the very next quintuplet flourish in the middle of measure 9, which
internally repeats the D#-F step progression in order. As I will discuss further below, the
quintuplet character again serves as a force of “summation,” rearticulating/reinforcing ideas
teased out in the more antagonistic exchanges between the legato and staccato voices.

Parsing the ATH in Measures 5-9
I have already discussed how the step relations contradict the dyadic partitioning of the AIT in
the first four measures; the same applies measures 4-9: the ATH partitions are contradicted by
both the step progressions and the character oppositions. Boland parses the music into ATH
complexes as follows:
Example 4.5: Boland’s Hexachordal Partitioning of Gra, measures 5-9.7

A mere glance at this annotated score shows clearly how the phrasing and the ATH parsing are at
odds—at least for the legato and staccato characters. A significant contradiction between step
progression and set class partition happens in measure seven, at the first transposition of the
ATH. The very interval that provides continuity at the center of the first six-note legato phrase—
7

See Boland 1999: 94.
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six notes that do not correspond with the main source hexachord—is the same location of
“harmonic” discontinuity: the Ab-Bb whole step (spelled G#-A#) straddles the divide between
the ATH and its first transposition, marked T3 in Boland’s excerpt. I understand this as a
deliberate contradiction, again part of Carter’s dialectical “game”: a set class transposition, the
first big moment of analytical segmentation, is contradicted by the first big moment of musical
continuity, the reinstatement of the original whole step. Again, where a set class analysis
attempts to draw a line, the music itself refuses it.

The Quintuplet Character in Measures 9 – 13
It is interesting to note that the musical phrasing and set class partitioning are not always at odds
in this piece. Phrase and partition are often consistent in the third musical character, the
quintuplet figure, which generally arpeggiates entire ATH forms—sometimes two in succession,
as in measure 13 (ATH-7 - ATH4). I wish to make some brief comments about the purpose of this
in relation to the other voices before I bring my discussion of the opening of this piece to a close.
Example 4.6: Carter – Gra, measures 8-13.
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Similar to the quintuplet character’s function as “summarizing” the AIT in measure 4, it appears
that the quintuplet character is likewise summarizing the ATH in measure 9 (in addition to
reinforcing the D#-F step progression mentioned above). However, is better to say that the
quintuplet character is bringing the ATH to the foreground for the first time, since it has only
been implied, indirectly, across the boundaries of the other characters types. This is not an
inconsistency, but actually serves an important function in relation to the contradictions
described above. The internal consistency of the quintuplet character reinforces the idea that the
contradiction between step relations and set forms is a conscious antagonism within legatostaccato opposition, and suggests yet another contradiction level of contradiction, that between
the self-identical and the non-identical. To be clear, this is a relation between concept and
referent. The particular musical relations in the staccato and legato characters in measures 5-9
are non-identical as compared to their governing musical “concept” (the ATH); on the other
hand, the quintuplet character in measures 9 and 13 is self-identical it. The contradiction is now
seen on a higher, behavioral level, between characters that contradict their concepts and a
character that reinforces it.

Presenting no internal contradictions—“what you see is what you get”—the quintuplet character
therefore quickly can reframe or “set” new registral fixtures quickly: for example, the new C# at
the apex of the figure in measure 9 and the A at its termination. Both pitches serve as important
points for step connections to be emphasized later. The G-A step is exposed in the low register of
the staccato voice in measure 12, while the C# anticipates the D# in measure 11.
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The quintuplet character can also quickly pull together many ideas previously introduced and
worked over in the legato and staccato voices. The climactic phrase starting on the upbeat to
measure 10 (through 11) provides an example of such a convergence. It begins with an F triplet
eighth, suggesting that the legato character has taken over F’s new registral placement, which
was introduced by the staccato character at the beginning of the measure and reinforced within
the quintuplet flourish. The F dips down to A, also taken from the quintuplet figure, which is
almost 2 triplet eights in length. For a moment it would seem that the legato voice has returned,
but the quintuplet motion intrudes without break with a quasi-cadenza that outlines the same E-F
semitone, the E now displaced up two octaves from its original position, a major seventh above
F’s new location. Recall that the F-E semitone framed the legato phrase in measures 6-8; it now
serves as a registral frame in measure 11. Furthermore, the new C# previously introduced is
retained; taken with F-E, this is a clear development of the (013) trichord heard in the opening
gesture, inverted, and sharing its two most prominent pitches. Lastly, to retain the same flavor a
semitone descent, D# appears as E’s lower neighbor, appoggiatura, and also as a passing tone
from C#. More than a summation of the prominent ideas unfolded over the course of the opening
measures, it also is a “condensation” of everything: notes F and E, an (013) trichord that shares
those notes, both a semitone motion (E-D#-E) and a whole tone motion (C#-D#), and it
terminates with a high Bb as a new melodic apex (spelled A#).

That many core musical ideas, which were previously contentious issues, are here transformed
into a single fleeting gesture results in a certain lightness of character. The gesture also opens the
clarinet register wider, preparing for the arching arpeggiation in measure 13, which concludes on
a high G#. Should we hear it as a much displaced (metrically and registerally) step relation to the
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A# at the end of measure 11’s gesture?

The whole step relations in the intervening staccato connective,8 measure 12, are much more
readily heard: he high C following the A# of the previous measure, and of course the G-A step in
the low register are obvious. The F# can be heard locally as a tritone descent from C, on its way
to C#, but there is also a possibility of hearing it in relation to the strongly emphasized E in
measure 11. If we cannot yet hear this as a step relation, the last quintuplet gesture certainly
connects them in direct succession. It’s as if the E-F# step relation needed time to congeal.
Notice, also, that the final quintuplet flourish also reinforces the D#-E semitone motion from
measure 11: every note of this gesture between C and G is fixed except for the D#, which sounds
on the way down, and the E, which sounds on the way up. The quintuplet figure is heard
continuing the semitone relation own quasi-cadenza in measure 11. If we include the C# on the
downbeat, the same C#-D#-E from beat 2 of measure 11 can be traced right through.

Conclusion
I have attempted to demonstrate what a non-reductive analysis attentive to the concrete ideas
presented in this piece might look like. My Adornian thrust was moreover to tease out the
moments of both non-identity and, as was the case with the quintuplet character, identity with
respect to the governing concepts of this work. It is perhaps as laborious a process to “analyze”
in this way as it would be to recompose the piece, but I hope that such a discussion would remind
8

I hear this staccato measure as a connective between the two quintuplet characters. The reason it is heard as a
disjointed connective, and not introducing something contradictory or different, is both because it continues the step
relations but is itself also generalized: it is the first staccato passage that is self-identical with respect to its concept.
Like the quintuplet flourishes in measure 9 and 13, it presents an unambiguous ATH statement (ATH5), or
“unfolding,” and thus offers no internal contradiction. This is akin to “liquidation” in tonal music, much like a
generalized scalar passage or arpeggio figure that de-particularizes the concrete thematic material in order to prepare
an immanent cadence or modulation.
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us of possible considerations not readily accommodated by conventional set class approach. I
regard this music—the pieces of Carter’s Seconda Prattica—particularly amenable to an
“Adornian” approach, for lack of a better term, because I understand the issue of conceptual (or
“harmonic”) identity/non-identity as its animating core. I hope to demonstrate this more
conclusively in a more expansive format wherein the philosophical and analytical elements in
both Adorno and Carter could receive a more adequate exploration.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion: Historically Framing Carter’s Periodization

The Social Significance of Carter
Elliott Carter is a unique figure in the history of modern American music. His unusual longevity
sustained a creative output stretching from the immediate postwar years into the twenty-first
century, which he approached with an abounding productivity unsurpassed by any composer—
perhaps even of any artist—of such advanced age. His musical orientation changed significantly
over the course of this seventy-five-year period. The most obvious shift was from his “populism”
of the 1940s to what is regarded as his mature style—a dissonant, high modernist idiom of
unparalleled complexity—which Carter developed in the fifties and sixties and pursued until the
very last year of his life. This sixty-two-year “mature” period was no stylistic monolith, but also
underwent subtle changes in orientation and procedure. However, while many composers of his
generation responded to changing external trends, Carter’s work always was always immanently
progressive; through his very last piece, composed in his 104th year, Carter continually strove to
rework his compositional approach through itself in order to achieve something new, never
capitulating to the prevailing stylistic norms of a given moment.

While Carter’s music has received just attention in the music theoretical scholarship for its
ingenious approaches to non-serial, twelve-tone harmony and his unique conception and
articulation of musical time—explored in an already impressive body of Carter literature—I
suggest that the true significance of Carter’s music should be understood from a broader sociohistorical perspective. Carter consistently produced highly advanced art over the course of a
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period of profound socio-economic transformation in modern American history: the roughly
sixty-year span that began as a moment of unprecedented growth, shared prosperity, and relative
economic stability in the two decades following WWII and ended as a moment of extreme
inequality and economic instability by the second decade of the current millennium. Judith Stein
(2010) divides this period into three phases: the 1950s and ‘60s is the “Great Compression”
phase of equitable wealth distribution and shared prosperity engendered by New Deal policies
and expanded by postwar Keynesianism; the 1970s is a “Pivotal Decade” of economic crisis and
recession that shook the postwar liberal consensus; and the “Age of Inequality” follows with the
anti-Keynesian policy reversals of the Reagan administration that established the neoliberal
consensus of the last three decades. Carter scholars will recognize that these historical junctures
are consistent with a broad periodization of the composer’s mature work: the masterpieces of the
1950s and ‘60s, the employment of the long-range polyrhythm and turn to vocal music in the
1970s, and the increasing productivity and distillation of harmonic practice of the 1980s and
‘90s. I would like to suggest that the shifts in Carter’s compositional practice over the course of
his maturity are not only correlated with these historical shifts but are mediated by them. If we
take Adorno’s work seriously, one could also argue that Carter’s music itself reveals much about
these broad socio-historical shifts as well.

Adorno offers a method of thinking through the most advanced forms of musical composition in
relation to their socio-historical dialectic. Adorno suggests that there is not merely such a
dialectic at play in serious music, but that it is the key to unlocking its meaning. If Carter
represents the forefront of American modernism faithfully pursued over the greater part of the
postwar period and beyond, an adequate aesthetics of his music must also consider not only the
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history of this period but the degree to which its changing socio-historical dynamics are
implicated in the material of his works. In this light, it should be no surprise that the dynamics of
Carter’s mature compositional practice track the dramatic shifts in post-war American life. More
than mere coincidence, it could be reasonably argued that Carter’s work is significant because it
most fully and faithfully registers these dynamics.

On the Problem of Mediation
Before turning to my materialist sketch of Carter’s periodization, it necessary to address the
problem of mediation. Simply put: how the social-historical world is registered in musical
structures. It is trivial to say that all art reflects the society; a theory of mediation is instead
concerned with the ways in which art particularizes certain social and historical antagonisms in
its form. For Adorno, this happens only in certain ways and only in certain kinds of music. While
all music is mediated by society to some extent, only self-reflective, autonomous music (like
Carter’s) can adequately respond to society and register its dialectic, which is imprinted in the
work like a code or cipher.1 Adorno’s Leibnizian image of a “windowless monad” attempts to
capture this idea: society is immanently imprinted in the work of art but in such a way that the
work appears completely alien and closed off to it.2
1

Autonomous works are thoroughly concerned only with the immanent logic of form and are therefore wholly
resistant to the heteronomous forces of the market and the dictates of commodity culture. This enables them to stand
in opposition to greater society and enables them to critique their own norms/conventions that have a part in
determining their production. For Adorno, aesthetic autonomy is the litmus test for authentic art under the culture
industry and late capitalism. For a recent discussion of the autonomy of art and the commodity form see Brown
2019.
2
This idea is not fleshed out in Adorno’s work, only appears as fragmentary insights across key texts. Consider
another statement in Aesthetic Theory: “That artworks as windowless monads ‘represent’ what they themselves are
not can scarcely be understood except in that their own dynamic, their immanent historicity as a dialectic of nature
and its domination, not only is of the same essence as the dialectic external to them but resembles it without
imitating it. The aesthetic force of production is the same as that of productive labor and has the same teleology; and
what may be called aesthetic relations of production—all that in which the productive force is embedded and in
which it is active—are sedimentations of imprintings of social relations of production” (Adorno 1998a: 5). See also
Adorno 1998a: 179-181.

96

The process that transpires in artworks and is brought to a standstill in them is to be
conceived as the same social process in which the artworks are embedded; according to
Leibniz’s formulation, they represent this process windowlessly. The elements of an
artwork acquire their configuration as a whole in obedience to immanent laws that are
related to those of the society external to it. (Adorno 1998a: 236)
Adorno’s materialist theory of musical production—the “immanent laws” referred to above—is
essential to understanding how a musical work could be “windowless monad” of society and not
a mere homology, not a “reflection” of a particular historical context haphazardly read back into
the work. For Adorno, every work of art is mediation between the historically formed material
the artist inherits and their particular subjectivity as expressed through their artistic labor. The
musical material confronts the composer objectively, as chords, scales, and the like, up to and
including genre, forms, conventions, etc.—anything already socially and historically formed that
the composer uses to create a new musical work. Certain elements are historically fixed, or
“immediate” (as in its mediated nature is hidden)—like tonal harmony for Mozart—while certain
elements appear as historically mediated (often as elements of style), and therefore available to
the composer to reimagine—like tonal harmony for Schoenberg. However, everything the
composer inherits is a product of previous creation; Adorno expresses the apparent objectivity of
the musical material as instead “sedimented Subjectivity.”3

3

This idea is similar to the notion of “congealed labor” in Marx. I am unaware of any Adorno scholarship that
connects his dialectic of the musical material to Marx’s concept of congealed labor as the objective nature of fixed
capital. Instead, Max Paddison traces this notion to Hanslick’s Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (1854): “Composing is the
working of the mind in material capable itself of becoming cognitive [ein Arbeiten des Geistes in geistfähigem
Material]. In the hands of creative genius the musical material is fluid and responsive ... the composer works with
the effects of handed-down sounds from the past. ... As the creation of a thinking and feeling mind [Geist] it follows
from this that a musical composition has to a high degree the capacity itself to be intelligent [geistvoll] and
expressive [gefühlvoll]” (quoted in Paddison 2010: 264).
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Adorno understands the act of composition in the following way: social material (congealed
previous musical labor) confronts the composer with an apparently fixed, objective status; the
composer “takes up” this material and “works it through” in order to produce a work.4 The
creative process is dialectical in that it includes a crucial moment of negation: the composer must
both respond to the demands inherent in the material and also resist them in order to create
something beyond that to which the material has previously given form. In other words, a
fundamental contradiction of Subject and Object can be understood at the heart of the production
process: the Subject must both respond to and through the Objective material, which both
determines possibilities of creation as much as it demands that its objective tendencies are
resisted. This likewise entails a contradiction between universal and particular: the composer
must recognize the abstract universality of the material’s core tendencies but actualize them
through his work in a concrete, particular way. Essentially, great or “progressive” composers, in
Adorno’s words, have the depth of vision to be able to undermine conventions and norms that
have been sedimented in the material, apparently immediate and unchanging, and transform them
by means of their work into a new musical object, the unique product of their labor; in doing this,
they actualize the binding “universals” (those that make music “universally” intelligible)
inherent in the material, render them particular and concrete in through the work itself.

What is critical here is the fact that the musical material is a historically specific social product.
Therefore, artistic labor is social labor, labor that is also historically specific and socially
concrete. Likewise, the composer as Subject is himself mediated by society, the Objective form
of social organization, which determines his social being and the manner of his labor in
4

This is akin to the Freudian concept of “working through” previous trauma: the composer both repeats and resists
the sedimented Subjectivity of previous artistic labor—whether his own or that of the tradition he works within.
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historically specific ways. While the composer does not labor to produce a social product in a
strict economic sense, his activities are nonetheless bound up in a particular societal
superstructure that is determined by the specific historical development of both the forces and
relations of social production. For Adorno, these forces and relations are latently implicated in
the artistic work. In Adorno’s words:
Social forces of production, as well as relations of production, return in artworks as mere
forms divested of their facticity because artistic labor is social labor; moreover, they are
always a product of this labor. In artworks, the forces of production are not in themselves
different from social productive forces except by their constitutive absenting from real
society. Scarcely anything is done or produced in artworks that does not have its model,
however latently, in social production. The binding force of artworks, beyond the
jurisdiction of their immanence, originates in this affinity. (Adorno 1998a: 236)
This reveals another dialectic, the most crucial: works of art are both autonomous, apparently
divorced from the social process, and yet they are also products of a kind of artistic social labor
that is determined by the social process. In a sense, the apparent “problem” of social mediation is
very much a feature of artistic mediation itself: that a work of art is apparently not determined by
society is by virtue of the fact that it most adequately registers society in its aesthetic form.
Autonomous works, works totally committed to the immanent logic of their form, appear as
harmonious and complete, take on an auratic character of aesthetic semblance that is almost
metaphysical in quality—i.e. above material reality. In short, they no longer appear as products
of human social labor.5 For Adorno, the contradictory thing about such aesthetic autonomy is that
it is always a product of mediation: the act of mediation actually erases the appearance of
mediation. At bottom, works of art are always products of human labor, labor which attempts to
create aesthetic harmony from socially mediated material, which, as Adorno’s negative dialectics
attempts to show, is marked by a fundamental disharmony. Nevertheless, works strive to
5

Music is especially suited to this because of its non-materiality, at least compared to the plastic arts, and the
apparent immediacy of its temporal medium—Bergson’s durée.
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overcome this contradiction, they labor to transcend the antagonisms of the social world and
their precarious place within it—but, in the last analysis, they fail. To return to an illuminating
quote cited above:
The moment in the work of art by which it transcends reality cannot, indeed be severed
from [its social materiality]; that moment, however, does not consist in achieved
harmony, in the questionable unity of form and content, inner and outer, individual and
society, but in those traits in which the discrepancy emerges, in the necessary failure of
the passionate striving for identity. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2006: 103)
The moments of failure in a work of art are its indexes of society, or the contradictions thereof.
This idea should be the guide for a materialist aesthetics in general and of Carter’s music in
particular: the moments at which the striving for aesthetic harmony on the level of the material
dialectic fail are those which most open up to the particular contradictions of American society.
The success of an Adornian aesthetics of Carter’s music will depend upon the extent to which
these material failures—which are confronted and worked through dialectically by means of
technical developments and/or aesthetic reorientation—can be shown as being responsive to
parallel developments, also antagonistic, in American society. Instead of reflecting them, these
material antagonisms should be understood as moments of sublimation that reveal as much about
their social origin as Carter’s own aesthetics.

My historical materialist sketch of Carter’s oeuvre intends to outline some of the defining sociohistorical antagonisms in the American society from postwar to present that may be relevant in
the interpretation of his music. My ultimate aim is not to provide a social justification of the
music, but suggest the dialectical notion of both interpreting Carter’s music in reference to its
changing socio-historical contexts and interpreting postwar American society by virtue of an
explication of some of the more remarkable elements of Carter’s aesthetics. While beyond the

100

scope of this chapter, I would nonetheless like to offer some fruitful ideas that could be pursued
toward this end. Adorno argues that by immersing oneself in the “idea” of particular works their
social essence emerges of its own dynamic. Granted, the idea of the work and its social nexus
must be “philosophically constructed,” but it is always grounded in the examination of particular
elements of the works in question, which present the greater social totality in the ways which
problems of composition are taken-up and worked-through.6 By building on the already
extensive and valuable Carter scholarship, much of which has insightfully illuminated the
technical features of Carter’s work, this kind of interpretation should strive to connect various
junctures in the evolution of Carter’s compositional procedure to the broader social situation of
his work. This, in turn, should offer deeper insight into the material dialectic that innervates his
music.

An Historical Materialist Sketch of Carter’s Periodization
My framing of Carter’s oeuvre is informed by Judith Stein’s work on the history of postwar
political economy. Stein places special emphasis on the crises of 1970s as a transitional moment,
a “Pivotal Decade,” wherein the Keynesian consensus of the postwar “Great Compression”
undergoes significant crisis and restructuring, emerging as the “Age of Inequality,” beginning
roughly with the Reagan administration and lasting at least until the financial crisis of 2008.
Carter’s mature compositional output straddles both sides of the “Pivotal Decade,” and a
periodization of his music can arguably trace these broad socio-historical shifts:
1. Carter’s “First Mature Period”: 1950-1969
2. Carter’s “Pivotal Decade”: 1970-1979
3. Carter’s “Second Mature Period”: 1980-2008
6

For Adorno’s remarks in this regard see Adorno 2006b: 24.
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Carter’s First Mature Period consists of the pieces written in the 1950s and ‘60s, in which he is
pursuing a material dialectic that attempts to successfully mediate between individual and
collective, which reaches a breaking point in String Quartet No. 3 of 1971.7 I see the 1970s as a
decade of rupture and transition, where Carter’s practice undergoes significant changes in
response to both the objective tendencies of his material dialectic and the socio-economic crises
that define this period. The 1980s and beyond represent Carter’s Second Mature Period in which
the material crises of the 1970s engender the Long Range Polyrhythm and a new aesthetic
orientation that ultimately congeals into his Seconda Prattica of the 1990s. As mentioned in
Chapter Three, I do not consider this latter development to be a “late style”; Carter’s Seconda
Prattica is an aesthetic arrival point, whereas a true “late style,” in the Adornian sense, is a
departure. I therefore understand Carter’s Seconda Prattica in the 1990s as a refinement of the
new direction his aesthetics have taken in the neoliberal era. The question of Carter’s Late Style
presents an interpretive issue from an historical point of view, which I will briefly mention in my
summary of each period below.

Carter’s First Mature Period: 1950-1969
I suggest that Carter’s music of this period is characterized by an impulse to mediate between the
general and particular in each work, which Carter approaches in different directions in each
decade: in the works of the 1950s the whole is generated from the parts, from their particular
oppositions; in the works of the 1960s the parts are generated from the whole, from tensions in
harmonic and formal schemata. These compositional concerns parallel the dialectic of the
individual and the social in Adorno’s theory of the administered society, which outlines the
7

The year Nixon takes the United States off the gold standard, which Stein argues engenders the various crises of
the ensuing years.
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contradictions within the large, bureaucratically administered states (particularly the US) that
that emerged after WWII (overlaid with the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War) and their
regressive role in determining the possibilities for individual human development.8 It would be
appropriate to read Carter’s music of this period metaphorically as having a “democratic”
character, as is customary in the Carter scholarship, only if one recognizes that the contradiction
between individual and collective is not reconciled, neither musically nor historically.9 An
interpretation of this issue in Carter’s music should be informed by an analysis of the Keynesian
liberal consensus that governs this era, preparing the discussion for the crises it engenders in the
1970s. Carter’s “material crisis” in the 1970s, as I understand it, registers the socio-economic
crises of Stein’s “Pivotal Decade,” a moment of broad structural transition wherein the largesse
of the postwar state is gradually dismantled and the governing ideology shifts in favor of a
leaner, anti-social neoliberal order. Special attention should be paid to not only the shifts in
Carter’s approach to rhythm, harmony, and form, but what they signify for the possible “end” of

8

Adorno also characterizes the contradiction of modern capitalist society as one between an advanced state of
productive forces and the arrested state productive relations. Making a conscious allusion to Marx’s comment that
the realm of freedom begins when the realm of necessity is left behind, Adorno argues that the in the 20th century
Marx’s assumption “has ceased to hold good” (Adorno 2008: 48)—the realm of material necessity has indeed been
left behind, but the realm of freedom has yet to be actualized: “the [current] forces of production could satisfy
human needs and enable mankind to enter into a condition worthy of human beings… The situation is rather that
society has discovered ways and means of channeling the unstoppable growth in the forces of production and of
keeping it under control” (ibid). Under the dominance of late-stage monopoly capital and modern, bureaucratic,
administered society “people are reduced more and more to the status of functions” (Adorno 2006: 5) within the
economic totality. Freedom remains superficial, part of only private life, and “lacks substance as far as people’s
ability to determine their own lives” (ibid).
9
Nevertheless, I view the issue of mediation between general and particular in the music of this period as an
expression of the social contradiction that the postwar interventionist state presents: the new role of the state as an
instrument to mitigate the contradictions of capital through various means including brokering a compact between
capital and labor, ensuring “full” employment, providing a social safety nets, investing in public goods, etc. while
bolstering its European allies through the Marshall Plan and managing the Western economy through the Bretton
Woods system.
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the particular type of mid-century American high-modernism that was underwritten by the
postwar state.10

Carter’s Pivotal Decade: 1970-1979
Whereas dialectical mediation between general and particular is the appropriate lens for
understanding Carter’s approach to harmony, rhythm, and form in the previous decades, his
music of the 1970s breaks with this schematic. I argue that this dialectic of the individual and the
social in Carter’s first maturity reaches a crisis in the Third String Quartet of 1971, and an
impasse in the Duo for Piano and Violin of 1974.11 The divisions and antagonisms in these pieces
are expressions of extreme social alienation, a symptom of the state of American society in the
wake of the Nixon Shock of 1971, the 1973 OPEC embargo and energy crisis, the 1974 crash
and recession, and the “downturn” and ultimate US withdrawal from Vietnam, all of which
contributed to the general malaise and disappointment in what appeared to be the failure of the
liberal post-war order. Much along the lines of Adorno’s discussion of Schoenberg’s
expressionism as both the objective result of the material dialectic and a registering of real social
trauma, one may argue that these works are both the result of Carter’s pursuit of his own material
dialectic and direct responses to the crises of the 1970s as well.12

10

It would be critical to develop a fuller account of the political economy of postwar modernism in this regard.
Guberman 2012 has traced some of the dynamics of the “cultural Cold War” as it pertains to Carter. For a discussion
of this issue at the American Academy in Rome see Brody 2014. Granted, Carter persists in writing high-modernist
music beyond the end of the social situation that made it possible, an issue that should be addressed in a discussion
of his music under the neoliberal regime.
11
I nonetheless view the Concerto for Orchestra is the climactic work of his first mature period, which must be read
alongside the various crises of 1968: the student movements, war protests, Vietnam downturn (Tet Offensive), the
moment when the economic contradictions of the “administered society” begin to reach their breaking point. An
analysis of the economic downturn of this period and its relation to the state’s financing of the war in Vietnam
should undergird any social commentary.
12
This is not to say that an analysis of the economic contradictions that reach an inflection point in this period
should not be cornerstone for an interpretation of the social situation of the 1970s. Blyth 2002 and Stein 2010 are
invaluable in this regard. See also Phillips-Fein 2017 for an analysis of the New York fiscal crisis of the mid 1970s.
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The “Pivotal Decade” witnesses two important changes in Carter’s compositional approach: the
employment of the Long Range Polyrhythm and an aesthetic shift to a single, if divided, musical
Subject. Carter first employs the Long Range Polyrhythm (LRP) in the 1970s, which I suggest is
a musical objectification of temporal alienation, a condition inherent to the capitalist mode of
production but particularly potent with the shift to a post-industrial, globalized economy, as
outlined above. While Carter had consistently employed different simultaneous speeds in his
musical textures, the LRP is the first total, structural reification of musical time in Carter’s work.
One may argue that the dialectic of abstract and concrete time in Carter’s music becomes reified
in the LRP at a moment where the crisis of Keynesian liberalism is at its most dire, and the
dialectic of the individual and the social—both in social life and in Carter’s practice—reaches an
impasse. The LRP is not a sublation of the temporal antagonisms of his previous works, but
productive reification of it, which formalizes the opposition of concrete and abstract musical
time at a moment American history when the postwar notion of “the social”—and the state’s role
in securing it—strains and breaks. I have already suggested a possible materialist framework for
understanding the emergence of this device in this period; further analysis, both historical and
musical, could build a more convincing argument for this perspective.13

Extreme social and political alienation is the context for the rise of a new subjectivism in
Carter’s subsequent works, which parallels the neoliberal turn and a broad shift to anti-social
domestic policy, as exemplified by the New York fiscal crisis in 1974. This moment is marked
13

An interesting notion to pursue in connection with this is the adoption of atomic time as the international standard
beginning in 1972, replacing GMT. Atomic time replacing solar time as a standard represents a paradigm shift in the
conceptualization of time from concretely determined by the experience of daily life (literally, life of days) to
abstractly determined by scientific calculation of a supposed atomic constant. Of course, this enables the advance in
speed of digital information systems needed for finance capital accumulation in the post-industrial economy. See
Adam 2004 and Martineau 2016 for a starting point on the relation between perspectives of time and their
material/social basis.
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by Carter’s return to vocal music. While Carter had engaged with poetry abstractly in his
instrumental works of previous years, the Bishop-Ashbury-Lowell triptych introduces a single,
self-alienated musical Subject for the first time in Carter’s aesthetic. Carter’s turn to poetry,
specifically post-war confessional poets of his generation, can be understood along the lines of
Adorno’s characterization of the bourgeois turn inward in the 19th century—the rise of a kind of
reactionary subjectivism in response to unresolved social crises. I suggest that Carter’s is a
divided musical Subject, that the tensions and oppositions of his previous work are now
internalized with a traumatized, self-alienated modern Subject. A hermeneutics of Carter’s vocal
triptych toward this end is paramount, with special attention to Syringa, the centerpiece of
Carter’s vocal trilogy and the only work for which Carter fashioned a second text.

Carter’s Second Mature Period: 1980-2008
The ideological shift from Keynesian liberalism to Reaganite neoliberalism, from Johnson’s
“Great Society” to Thatcher’s “there is no such thing as society,” undermines the possibility of
using social categories to interpret Carter’s work since 1980s without qualification. While
scholars read what I call the dialectic of the individual and the social into works of this later
period, I contend resemblances of this dialectic in Carter’s music after the 1970s need to be
qualified. In general, the 1970s represents an official break with New Deal politics—particularly
with full employment and robustly funded public goods—and therefore an ideological break with
the ideal of the social that guided the post-war period.14 This is especially acute in the 1990s after
the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. I contend that without the justification
of political economy, whatever ideological remnants the social that persisted into the 1980s were

14

Succinctly put, “the nation replaced the assumption of the earlier era that capital and labor would prosper together
with an ethic that postulated that by promoting capital would eventually benefit labor…” (Stein 1998: 6).
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little more than unifying propaganda in the face of a shared Communist enemy; by 1992 the
notion of the social no longer held any political force. For this reason, I argue that Carter’s
“second mature period” spans the 1980s and ‘90s up until his centenary in 2008.15 I maintain that
the divided Subject emerges as the primary paradigm for understanding the post-modern,
neoliberal Subject, and therefore also the musical Subject of Carter’s “second mature period.”16

While postmodernism can be understood as the “cultural logic of late capitalism” (Jameson
1991), Carter’s works of this period do not represent a departure from modernism, despite being
written under the neoliberal regime. While Carter’s music does register these socio-historical
changes, he is able to persist in the same manner of the autonomous, high-modernism he
developed in the previous world. Following Marx, I suggest that Carter is able to carry on in a
“bubble” of formal subsumption established in the immediate post-war period while
neoliberalism gradually subsumed all forms of serious music into the 1990s, effectively
eradicating all other traces of high-musical modernism that were not also similarly insulated.17

Nonetheless, it is vital to consider Carter’s new harmonic practice in the context of
neoliberalism. Carter’s gradual distillation of his harmonic means culminates in a Seconda
Prattica, founded on the primacy of three main source sets: the two all-interval tetrachords and
the all-trichord hexachord. This non-contextual atonal practice can be seen as a quasi-public

15

The 2008 crisis marks the end the “successful” monetarist management of the economy that prevailed since Paul
Volker’s appointment to the FED in the late 1970s. Stein (2010) suggests that the housing and financial crises of
2007-2008 represent an indictment of neoliberalism. Whatever the significance of this historical marker from the
perspective of political economy, it is a significant moment in Carter’s life and career: it is not only his centennial,
but also marks a significant uptick in his productivity and the concomitant fracturing of his Seconda Prattica,
discussed briefly below.
16
Despite occasional regression to the divided ensemble, a device that becomes academic in this second maturity.
17
See Brown 2019 on the significance of aesthetic autonomy under late capitalism and the distinction between
formal and real subsumption in Marx as it pertains to cultural production.
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language in the sense that it retains its basic features and conventions outside of the context of a
particular piece; its public nature can be understood in its availability for other composers as
well. An investigation of Adorno’s theory of tonality as the language of bourgeois exchange
relations could inform an interpretation of Carter’s new harmonic practice as a possible
mediation of his social world, which is one of tepid triumph in the fall of the Soviet Union and
the rise of the new neoliberal Washington consensus.18

It would also be important to consider how Carter’s Seconda Prattica recovers an Adornian
sense of aesthetic semblance in its auratic reconstitution of the work as harmonious totality.
Whereas Boland understands Carter’s music of this period as presenting a “vision of utopia” by
means of its “unification” of the individual and social, I instead read this music as recovering a
sense of auratic semblance by means of its non-contextual harmonic language. This enables the
possibility to interpret the undermining or fracturing of aesthetic semblance observed in Carter’s
last works to be evidence of an Adornian “late style.”

“Late Style” in Carter
An Adornian late style is a “turning away” from the world, a fragmentation of style, and not an
establishment of new norms and conventions. Therefore, it is not a “period,” but resists the very
consistencies of style that suggest periodization. The investigation of Carter’s late style should be
radically particular, concerned with specific pieces, even specific moments, that fracture the

18

The significance of the Clinton administration’s deregulation of the financial sector at this time could be a starting
point for historically grounding Carter’s quasi-public atonal language of this period. The repeal of the 1933 Banking
Act (Glass-Steagall) in 1999 as a culmination of Clinton-era deregulation could be seen as the root cause of the
2007-2008 crises, which mark Carter’s centenary and a fracture of his Seconda Prattica. This is one of my more
speculative of suggestions that I nonetheless feel could be fruitfully considered in an Adornian aesthetics of Carter’s
music.
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norms of the Seconda Prattica. This happens unevenly, but increasingly toward the very last
years of his life. It is indicated in the effervescence, transparency, and fragility of certain pieces
both with respect to its aesthetic character and its treatment of the musical material, which he
ultimately cultivated and pruned down to its barest, most naked form in his last works. Instead of
a Beethovenian rage into the dying light, music in Carter’s late style disintegrates, truly bears the
age of its “fruit,” in the Adornian sense. A consideration of where this music breaks from the
Seconda Prattica and how it does is paramount. An interpretive analysis must also turn toward
the poetry he increasingly sought to express through music and how these texts could inform a
reading of Carter’s late style. Lastly, Carter’s own advanced age, perhaps even his corporeality,
is something to consider in connection with his late music. Having met Carter a handful of times
over the last years of his life, been able to witness his advanced age finally shrink his stature and
enfeeble his body, I suggest that his last works not only bear the weight of memory and arid
reflection that often accompany advanced age, but perhaps also corporal decay.19

In Place of a Conclusion
It has become apparent to me that an Adornian aesthetics of Carter’s music, if successfully
articulated, may not only illuminate the significance of Carter as the foremost “American”
composer of the 20th Century (for the reasons alluded to above), but may also justify the highly
suggestive elements of Adorno’s work that have hitherto been frustratingly difficult to show
outside of his own writings, particularly the problem of social mediation. If we can learn
anything from Adorno, it is the supreme priority of the object and the force of the irreducibly
particular; this suggests that a theory of social mediation is not articulable outside of a concrete
19

I cannot resist the impulse to see Carter’s fracture and disintegration of his Seconda Prattica alongside the
increasing crises of neoliberalism and the gradual dissolution of the Washington consensus.
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study—it cannot be explicated in theory, only demonstrated with the right example. Much like
Adorno’s Beethoven is the apotheosis of the revolutionary bourgeois Subject, of Hegel’s
philosophy, and the like, I would like to suggest that Carter is a similar an example: the
composer of a body of music that most fully registers the changing dynamics of American
society from the postwar period through the present era. Furthermore, that it perhaps most
closely embodies Adorno’s musique informelle, and therefore can be understood as the
continuation of the dialectic of early 20th century modernism as described in Philosophy of New
Music and represented by Schoenberg and Stravinsky. I hope I have suggested fruitful avenues
of interpretation toward these ends, which I will attempt to pursue in future work.
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